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Abstract
Neighborhood Associations, called Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs), have
assumed an important role in public policy decision making in Delhi as the principal voice of
the middle class. This represents a departure from the traditional role of these institutions
that was restricted to the boundaries of their neighborhoods. This development also follows
a Government of Delhi program, called Bhagidari, that institutionalized citizen government
participation through these very associations. This thesis attempts to establish a relationship
between middle-class activism, exemplified by the rise in neighborhood associations, and
local governance in mega-cities using the case of Delhi.
I observe that although implementation of Bhagidari did not change any formal
political structures in the city, it led to friction between political representatives and the
Delhi Government and Resident Welfare Associations. The media focus on the program and
the administrative mechanism adopted in its implementation contributed towards the rise of
RWAs. RWAs were able to influence public policy by forming citywide horizontal networks
with other RWAs and bargaining with the State through the channels of the media. The
various cases of activism reveal that this mobilization has been triggered by some form of
privatization of service delivery which resulted (or was believed to result) in increase in user
charges. The two RWA umbrella organizations that developed as a consequence of this
mobilization point towards a change in the traditional 'apolitical' character of middle class in
India. Although both shared related opinions on public policy issues, one assumed a
'watchdog' of the State role, while another mobilized neighborhood associations to contest
municipal elections. I discovered that neighborhood associations with pre-existing networks
with government agencies were more likely to remain apolitical, while the ones without these
social networks seek to become part of the government machinery through formal electoral
channels. Policies on decentralization instituted by the Federal Government and the Bhagidari
program have been instrumental in this change.
Thesis Supervisor: Bish Sanyal
Title: Ford International Professor of Urban Development and Planning
Chapter Outline
1. Introduction: The first chapter sets the contextual background for the thesis. I
introduce the city of Delhi in India, my case study and define key terms and institutions that
come up often in this research. I lay down main observations that intrigued me during the
course of fieldwork and define my research questions around them. I briefly describe the
main body of literature that aims at explaining these developments and how they are able to
explain only part of the puzzle. In the second part of this chapter, I describe the process
through which research evolved during the course of a year and two periods of fieldwork. I
finally elaborate on methodology and sources of data.
2: How associations of the Middle Class and the Urban Poor Access the State:
Chapter two describes the different channels through which middle-class associations and
residents of informal settlements access the State. I explore the history, membership
characteristics, and methods of operation of neighborhood associations in Delhi. The
Government of Delhi institutionalized citizen-government participation with these
neighborhood associations in 2000 through a program called Ihagidari' I study the factors
that led to implementation of the program and the administrative mechanisms through
which it was implemented. This chapter lays the contextual and theoretical background for
understanding how middle-class associations have come to dominate public policy discourse
in the city that I explore in the successive chapters.
3: New forms of accessing the State: Bhagidari story retold...Chapter three
examines the political impacts of the Bhagidari program. I look at the evolution of the
program as perceived by the various stakeholders (RWAs, Delhi Government and other
government agencies) and Chapter 2). I study the impact of the program on service delivery
and on the relationship between the Government of Delhi and other government agencies
involved in service delivery. I also describe the ways in which the relationship between
citizen-groups and government agencies, especially political representatives, changed as an
outcome of the program.
4. 'Apolitical' Activism by the Middle Class: This chapter reviews the dominant
literature that explains the rise of neighborhood associations in India in recent years and its
impact on urban public space. I describe the larger impacts of neighborhood associations on
public policy through formation of horizontal networks with other associations, exploring
the key role of media and judiciary in the process. I explore the factors behind this collective
action and the extent to which Bhagidari was instrumental in this change. I discover that
contrary to common perception, RWAs umbrella organizations are fragmented and
represent a change in the traditional role of civil society in India that has been disjointed
from formal electoral politics.
5. Political Impacts of Middle Class Activism: In chapter five, I try to understand
'who' within the array of neighborhood associations in the city decided to join formal
politics. I also explore the 'indirect' means through which neighborhood associations
influence formal politics by influencing the behavior of local political representatives. I argue
that policies on decentralization adopted by the Government of Delhi and the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi have been instrumental in this change.
6. Concluding thoughts: This chapter seeks to answer research questions introduced
at the beginning of the thesis. I try to understand the factors behind the implementation of
the Bhagidari program and the resultant (unintended) political impacts. I explore how
middle-class neighborhood associations are beginning to influence public policy both
through direct and indirect means and identify the external factors that have been
instrumental in this change. I also speculate on what these developments could mean for the
future of Indian cities.
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"...middle class anger pays.
the louder you scream the better."
Civil Society, New Delhi, September-October, 2005

Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter sets the contextual background for the thesis. I introduce the
city of Delhi in India, my case study and define key terms and institutions that come
up often in this research. I lay down main observations that intrigued me during the
course of fieldwork and define my research questions around them. I briefly
describe the main body of literature that aims at explaining these developments and
how they are able to explain only part of the puzzle. In the second part of this
chapter, I describe the process through which research evolved during the course of
a year and two periods of fieldwork. I finally elaborate on methodology and sources
of data.
1.1 The City of Delhi
Delhi is the second largest metropolis in India after Mumbai with a population of
more than 13 million. Located in northern India on the banks of the River Yamuna, it is one
of the oldest continually inhabited cities in the
world. New Delhi, built by the British as an
administrative quarter, is now the capital of the
Republic of India. As the seat of the Government
of India, New Delhi houses important offices of
the federal government, including the Parliament
of India, the Rashtrapati Bhavan (Presidential
Palace) and the Supreme Court of India.
Delhi has the political status of a federally-
administered Union Territory' known as the
" ~liTz._ 1 i" •- _1 ... •'i ... *j"~ f 1 ~1 " '•T U"•r A
taonao l C apia Ierritory or Dell ,i C~I 1). AN Map 1.1 Delhi: Location Map
constitutional amendment in 1992 (69 th
SA Union Territory (UT) is an administrative division of India. Unlike States, which have their own local
governments, Union Territories are ruled directly by the National Government. The government of UT is
headed by the Lieutenant Governor, appointed by the Central Government. There are seven union territories
in India. Delhi is on the verge of being granted statehood and currently has the status of National Capital
Territory (NCT).
Amendment) gave Delhi a special status among the Union Territories; Delhi has its own
Legislative Assembly (called Vidhan Sabba, with 70 constituencies) although with limited
powers. The National Capital Territory of Delhi comprises nine districts, three statutory
towns viz. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), New Delhi Municipal Committee
(NDMC) and Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB), 59 census towns and 165 villages. Delhi has
four major satellite cities which lie outside the National Capital Territory of Delhi. These are
Gurgaon and Faridabad (in Haryana), and Noida and Ghaziabad (in Uttar Pradesh).
Delhi has grown very rapidly in the last thirty years owing to immigration of workers
from across the country, especially from the states of Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Bihar and
Uttar Pradhesh. The population of the city as per the 2001 Census stood at 13.7 million. The
corresponding density was 9,294 persons per km2, with a sex ratio of 821 women per 1000
men, and a literacy rate of 81.82%. The estimated Net State Domestic Product (SDP) of
Delhi (2004-05) was US$ 20.5 billion (or 830.85 billion Indian rupees). The city has a per
capita income of US$ 1,329 (53,976 INR) which is about 2.5 times that of the national
average. The services sector contributes 70.95% of Delhi's gross SDP followed by secondary
and primary sectors with 25.2% and 3.85% respectively.
1.2 Institutional Environment
1.2.1 Government and Politics
As a special Union Territory, the National Capital Territory of Delhi has its own
Legislative Assembly, Lieutenant Governor, Council of Ministers and Chief Minister,
forming the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD). The
Legislative Assembly seats are filled by direct election from territorial constituencies in the
NCT. However, the Union Government of India and the Government of National Capital
Territory of Delhi jointly administer New Delhi. The legislative assembly was re-established
in 1993 for the first time since 1956, with direct federal rule in the span.
Delhi was a traditional stronghold of the Indian National Congress, also known as
the Congress Party. In the 1990s the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the leadership of
Madan Lal Khurana came into power. However in 1998, Congress regained power. Sheila
Dixit of Congress Party is the incumbent Chief Minister. A Congress-led alliance has also
been in power at the Central Government from 2004 onwards.
The Delhi High Court exercises jurisdiction over Delhi. The Delhi Police, headed by
the Police Commissioner, is one of the largest metropolitan police forces in the world. The
Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) is responsible for running the public bus system while
the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) operates the subway system.
The NCT of Delhi has three
local municipal corporations:
Municipal Corporation of Delhi
(MCD), New Delhi Municipal
Council (NDMC) and Delhi
Cantonment Board.
The Municipal Corporation of
Delhi is one the largest municipal
corporations in the world and has
jurisdiction over an estimated 13.78
million people. The capital of India,
New Delhi, falls under administration
of NDMC. The chairperson of the
NDMC is appointed by the
Map 1.2 The nine Administrative Districts in Government of India in consultation
Delhi as per the Government of Delhi
with the Chief Minister of Delhi. The
Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is the main agency involved in planning and
development of the city. DDA is also responsible for preparation and enforcement of the
Master Plan of Delhi. MCD and NDMC are chiefly responsible for maintenance of public
goods, most of which are developed by the DDA. Delhi is divided into 9 administrative
districts (see Map 1.2) by the Delhi Government. The MCD area is divided into 12 zones
and 272 wards (increased from 132 in 2007) (refer Map 1.3). The water supply in the city is
managed by the Delhi Jal Board (DJB). The Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB), the state-owned
utility agency was in charge of supplying electricity to the city until 2002 when it was
privatized into distribution companies (DISCOMs).
1.2.2 Typology of Settlements in Delhi
Neighborhoods in Delhi are typically termed as 'housing colonies'. The housing typology is
generally indicative of the socio-economic background of its residents. I would broadly
classify these into six categories. Planned neighborhoods are either plotted (single family
homes) or apartment style housing developed either by the Delhi Development Authority or
Cooperative Housing Societies through formal regulations/zoning guidelines. Most people
who live in this typology belong to middle-high income groups. 'Unauthorized' or
'unplanned' development refers to housing privately developed without following the
zoning regulations laid down by the Master Plan. As a result infrastructural facilities, like
electricity lines, water supply, paved roads etc, are not formally extended to these areas by
local governments. The population in this category could belong to any income group
because such housing is more a reflection of the gap between housing development by
government agencies and demand pushed by high population growth. Further, many
planned neighborhoods in the city have illegal constructions or alterations that are also
termed as 'unauthorized'. According to MCD estimates, of the total 3000 housing colonies
in Delhi, an estimated 1,600 are unauthorized with a population of more than 4 million
people. Further, of the 3.4 million buildings in the city, the MCD states 70-80% of them
have major or minor illegalities. Slum settlements, known as Jhuggi Jhopris (JJ) Clusters
are unauthorized settlements where residents do not have formal land titles. The population
in these settlements belongs to low-income groups, often migrant workers. These
settlements do not pay property tax. They are provided with very little infrastructure or
services beyond community water facilities, street lighting and community toilets (at times).
The other forms of settlements fall between the broad categories of 'planned' and
'unauthorized'. 'Regularized Colonies' are settlements that used to be unauthorized
colonies but were subsequently regularized, usually through political pressure often before
local elections. In the case of squatter settlements, this process is accompanied with granting
tenure rights to the residents. Till 1985 the government of Delhi 'regularized' these colonies
by providing services on a reduced scale to them. There are 660 such colonies spread all over
Delhi (Harriss, 2005a). 'Resettlement Colonies' are housing settlement developed usually
at the outskirts of the city where residents of JJ Clusters have been relocated. Residents of
these settlements belong to low-income group. Some researchers argue that the poorest
segment of the population resides in these settlements, as opposed to slum settlements
within the city (Baud, Shridharan, and Pfeffer 2006). 'Urban Village' is a concept unique to
Delhi and some other cities in northern India. These were villages within the National
Capital Territory of Delhi and treated as 'special areas' as per the Delhi Master Plan with the
intention to preserve their unique lifestyle and built form. As the city grew, these villages too
urbanized but without any urban design guidelines. Most urban villages are low-middle
income in nature, but there are a few high-income urban villages located in South Delhi.
1.3 The Actors and the Props
This research is set in the background of a Government of Delhi program called
Bhagidari, implemented in 2000. Bhagidari is a 'program of partnership between
government agencies in Delhi and citizens'. The 'government agencies' include the
Government of Delhi, local municipalities (Municipal Corporation of Delhi and New
Delhi Municipal Council), Delhi Development Authority, and utility agencies and companies
(Delhi Jal Board and power Distribution Companies) (see section 1.2.1). 'Citizens' were
represented by neighborhood associations, called Resident Welfare Associations 2 (RWA),
Market and Trader Associations (MTA), Industrial Associations, Village Groups and NGOs.
The main focus of the program however has been on RWAs. RWAs are essentially
neighborhood management committees in apartment blocks or housing colonies to which
the residents are required to pay regular charges, and which look after maintenance of
common resources (Harriss, 2005b). It is important to note that only RWAs from the
planned parts of the city, all of which are middle class in nature, were part of the program.
Although Bhagidari has diversified to other sectors like education, health, industry, etc in the
last seven years, RWAs continue to be the only institutions that represent neighborhoods.
RWAs at the city level are represented by two large umbrella organizations: 'People's
Action' and 'Delhi Resident Welfare Association Joint Front'.
Since RWAs are chiefly concerned with provision of civic amenities, the organization
they interact with most (on a day-to-day basis) is the MCD. MCD is in charge of solid waste
management, maintenance of roads and parks, drainage and provision of community
facilities. MCD comprises of two sections: the 'executive' and the 'deliberative' wing. The
executive wing is the technocratic part of the organization comprising of civil-servants. The
2 I use 'Neighborhood Association' and 'Resident Welfare Association' interchangeably in this thesis.
deliberative wing is represented by elected councilors at the ward level and the Mayor at the
city level. Political representatives from the Delhi Government are Members of Legislative
Assembly (MLA). They are headed by the Chief Minister of Delhi, currently Sheila
Dikshit. During my fieldwork, the Congress party was in power at both the Delhi
Government and MCD. The Congress also leads the coalition government at the Union.
The main opposition party is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Central Government
exerts significant control over Delhi, principally through the Ministry of Urban
Development (MoUD) and Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA).
1.4 Middle Class in India
The central actors in this story are Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs). These
associations are prevalent in middle class neighborhoods in the city in both the 'planned' and
'unauthorized' parts. This includes high income neighborhoods as well as middle income
neighborhoods. I use. the term 'middle class' to represent both types of neighborhoods
although many of these neighborhoods would theoretically fall in the 'upper middle class'
category. The resident in these neighborhoods are employed in white-collar salaried jobs,
mostly as professionals and managers. RWAs have been in existence in Delhi for many
years, growing fastest in the 1980s. The Bhagidari program put them in spotlight in the last
few years.
The 'middle-class' in India is however notoriously hard to define. Pavan Verma
(1998) uses a consumption based definition: who can afford three meals a day, have a home
to live in, access to basic healthcare, public transport and schooling. But most scholars have
tried to categorize this class based on 'cultural capital'. The Indian middle-class was
artificially created under British rule primarily through the educational policy introduced
specifically for meeting the administrative requirements of the Raj. Since educational
achievement during the period was tied to caste, higher caste Brahmins came to dominate the
middle class. Even after independence, the middle class was Nehruvian civil service oriented
sect. Later, this term referred to more than just the educated professional and business
classes but also included the landed proprietors (Frankel, 1988). In the 1970s and 80s, the
middle class came to include the entrepreneurial class. Fernandes (2006) argues that the
newness of the middle-class in the 90s refers to a 'process of production of a distinctive
social and political identity' that represents and lays claim to the benefits of liberalization.
This segment of the middle class comprises of the professional and managerial class that has
grown as an outcome of economic growth, especially the location of multinational firms in
large Indian cities.
The middle class is the main addresses of the national media and are at the core of
every political party's campaigning strategies. Interestingly, the middle class is characterized
by its distance from electoral politics with voter turnout having dropped to 35-40% by the
late 90s as opposed to more than 80% in poorer and slums. Politicians who choose to
ignore the middle class may not always lose a crucial vote bank, but make themselves
vulnerable to 'punishment' from the institutions that the middle class elites dominate and
control: the judiciary, the civil service, the election commission and the media (Mazzarella,
2006).
1.5 Key Observations during Fieldwork
I began this research by studying Bhagidan, a Government of Delhi program that
institutionalizes citizen participation in governance. Why Delhi was the first city where this
happened may perhaps be explained by its unique institutional environment: significant
control by the federal government that gives very little political space for implementation of
formal policies on decentralization laid out in the Constitution of India. But having grown
up in the city, what interested me more were developments surrounding the program.
Central to this was the changing role of Resident Welfare Associations, the principal
partners in the Bhagidari program. The sphere of influence of RWAs until a few years back
was restricted to the boundaries of their neighborhoods. Bhagidari, to an extent, strengthened
the relationship of these associations to the State. But what followed was an extension of
these boundaries to the realm of the city through development of horizontal networks with
other RWAs. RWAs from all over Delhi organized, and became one of the principal 'voice'
of the citizens in the media and public policy discourse. Not only did they become the
biggest critic of the state, but they also managed to tilt public policy decisions in their favor
on multiple occasions, like forcing the government to revert the hike in electricity rates or
prevent the privatization of the water utility agency.
This mobilization is rooted in the local but is not unique to it. Neighborhood
associations are on the rise in all large cities in India. But the graininess of the local is what
makes this story more interesting. Delhi saw formation of citywide horizontal networks
between neighborhood associations, many of which were part of the Bhagidari program. I
was surprised at how the two largest organizations of RWAs, that seem to represent a
unified voice in the media, embody diametrically opposite ideologies. While both groups had
similar opinions on government action, one chose to remain a watch-dog of the state while
the other sought to become a part of it by participating in the electoral process. What
surprised me even more was that RWAs, that is principally comprised of a middle-class
traditionally known to have extremely low voter turnout rates chose to run for political
office.
While interviewing political representatives, I discovered that neighborhood associations
were able to exert significant influence in public expenditure decisions at the local level. This
was a deviation from the past when many RWAs did not even know their local councilor.
These observations made me wonder if this was the beginning of a change in local
democratic politics in Indian cities. My research question seeks to answer some of these
questions that intrigued me during fieldwork in India.
1.6 Research Question
What drives the Bhagidari program are Resident Welfare Associations, not a product
of Bhagidari, but a manifestation of the rise of 'middle-class activism' in various spheres of
public life in large cities in India. This is a recent phenomenon, explained as an outcome of
the economic reform process of the early nineties. The behavior of neighborhood
associations in this respect is often associated with the literature on 'global cities'. Chatterjee
(2004) and Fernandes (2006) argue that in order to 'create conditions for foreign investment
and producing for the global market, the city is refurbished and new infrastructure put in
place'. The middle class is defined as the 'primary agents that mobilize to regain control over
urban public space' and reproduce a clear socio-spatial separation from groups such as street
vendors and squatters. Their argument is based on the rise of neighborhood associations in a
number of large Indian cities, all of which have significant global investment. This includes
Advanced Locality Management (ALM) program in Mumbai, Janagraha in Bangalore,
Resident Welfare Associations in Chennai, Delhi and other cities. Another body of literature
on the middle class focuses on governance - the mechanisms through which the middle-class
associations and the poor approach problem-solving in their respective neighborhoods (Rao,
Woolcock and Jha, 2007 and Harriss, 2005a). While the poor are more likely to be involved
in electoral politics, the middle class is known to access the State through the channels of
bureaucracy and judiciary. The political influence of the middle class is often characterized
by its 'apolitical' role, understood as its distance from formal electoral politics (Harriss,
2005b).
Both these theories, however. are able to explain only part of developments that
intrigued me during fieldwork: i.e. change in relationship between RWAs and government
agencies as an outcome of Bhagidari, and activism by RWAs and umbrella organizations of
RWAs that influenced public policy outcomes at the city level as well as the local ward level.
This research aims to look at the impact of middle-class activism on local governance. The
following sub-questions might be helpful in uncovering the larger puzzle:
1. What have been the reasons behind the implementation of the Bhagidari
programs and the (unintended) political impacts after it was implemented?
2. What are the factors that led to collective action by Resident Welfare
Associations and how did they influence public policy outcomes?
3. Why are some RWAs contesting local elections while others are not?
4. What are the other contextual factors that have influenced these
developments: Bhagidari and the rise of RWAs?
1.7 Methodology and Sources of Data
I spent about three and a half months in fieldwork in Delhi spread over the summer
of 2006 (2.5 months) and in December 2006-January 2007 (one month). This research is
primarily based on qualitative research. I conducted more than 50 interviews with current
and retired government officials (Government of Delhi and Municipal Corporation of
Delhi), political representatives (the Chief Minister, Members of Legislative Council of
Delhi, Municipal Councilors), members of RWAs and umbrella associations of RWAs,
leaders and residents of slum and informal settlements, academics and independent
researchers working in this area, representatives of media, and NGOs. I used both structured
and unstructured interviews (Refer Annex 1). Some of the analysis is ethnographic in nature:
observing Bhagidari meetings held in government agencies, public meetings held with
political representatives and media, etc.
I used two wards as case studies . The objective was not to conduct a comparative
analysis of the two wards, but to form a sample that would be representative enough of
different socio-
economic groups in
Stl,- it The wvr-lrd in
South Delhi (Ward
16) is primarily
middle-high income
in nature, with some
regularized colonies
and urban villages.
The ward also has
some of the elitist
neighborhoods in the
city. The second
ward I selected is in
North Delhi (Ward
33), a part of the city
. called Rohini,
towards the outskirts
ot the city (see Ivap
Map 1.3 MCD Ward Map of Delhi, 2007 1.3). This comprises
of middle income neighborhoods as well as informal settlements like JJ clusters,
unauthorized colonies and resettlement colonies. Henceforth I will refer to the two wards as
North Delhi and South Delhi Ward.
I use government reports, documents and circulars provided to me by the Delhi
Administration, MCD, DDA, and the Delhi Jal Board. I also collected data on Public
Interest Litigations (PILs) on civic matters in Delhi (from 2000 onwards) from Delhi High
3 Before the Municipal Elections in March 2007, when I carried out fieldwork, the MCD area was divided into
132 wards. The number of wards increased to 272 before the Municipal Elections in March 2007. This division
was based on population size: now every ward represents about 50,000 people. The gradation in color in
highlighted wards in Map 1.3 represents the sub-divisions that were hence created in the case-study ward. Ward
16 in South Delhi is now Ward 165 and 166, and Ward 33 in North Delhi is now divided in six wards, namely
21, 22, 49, 50, 51, 52.
Court. I was on the e-mail list for two of the RWA umbrella organizations and I use those
emails to trace the activities of the organizations. I collected newspaper articles while in
Delhi and from online sources again from 2000 onwards [under the search items: Bhagidari,
MCD elections, and Resident Welfare Association] to corroborate my findings from
interviews and to study the evolution of Bhagidari and RWAs. I use 2000 as a base year
(wherever possible) because Bhagidari was implemented in early 2000 and data since then
would have allowed me to analyze changes since its inception. Finally I have used published
and unpublished articles, theses, and books for literature review [on urban governance, fiscal
federalism, middle class and contemporary Indian politics]. A more details account of
methodology is presented in the section below (my research journey).
1.8 My Research Journey:
The questions that I have been trying to explore have evolved considerably since the
summer of 2006 as I began to understand the developments in Delhi (and the larger context
- social and economic changes and similar developments in other cities in India). This
section summarizes this thought process and the methodology I adopted for fieldwork:
Question in summer of 2006: What happens when you institutionalize citizen
participation: an evaluation of 'Bhagidarl
This research is part of a larger cross-national study on the impact of collective
action on service delivery carried out by Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Sussex. The
most recognizable form of collective action in Delhi is Resident Welfare Associations. Delhi
made for an interesting case because the Government of Delhi had institutionalized citizen
participation through a program called 'Bhagidar'. Citizen in this process were represented by
RWAs. I spent most of the summer trying to evaluate the success of Bhagidari/Resident
Welfare Associations in service delivery. This seemed like an interesting question because
there is a huge normative literature on why community participation is important - this is
something that virtually every development agency advocates - but I was not certain what
would happen when the State tried to engineer this process since community participation is
understood as an inherently 'organic' process.
1. Collective action and service delivery:
RWAs are a form of collective action. Measuring service delivery was tricky. The idea
was that collective action would be most effective when resources were scarce. Some parts
of Delhi have severe water scarcity. Other factors (income levels, type of neighborhood,
tenure status etc) remaining constant, I thought that water delivery would be a function of
collective action through RWAs. This approach could help me identify two neighborhoods
and identify the factors that made one successful. The case study I chose was in the south of
Delhi that has been facing water crunch for some time and although high to middle income,
has quite a few low-income/squatter settlements that would provide a balanced sample. I
spent a lot of time looking for neighborhood level data on water delivery, that does not
unfortunately exist! Water is delivered through different medium (pipes, tankers, kiosks, etc)
and utility agencies do not maintain data beyond the zonal level (comprising of about 50
neighborhoods). Water delivery is more a function of physical and technological factors like
slope, distance from the main (city) lines, etc. The second methodological problem was that
although water seemed to be the most important area-level issue, all neighborhoods did not
list water as their prime concern.
2. Collective action and problem solving:
The new methodology I adopted was to concentrate on how problems regarding local
infrastructure (internal roads, construction works like boundary walls, community halls,
parks etc) and service delivery (garbage disposal/collection, maintenance of parks etc) are
solved. The Government of Delhi did maintain a database of RWAs (that participated in the
program), which it did not update very often. The entry point I used was an RWA umbrella
organization. I built the rest of contacts mostly by snowballing from this entry point and the
ones further developed. I interviewed many RWA members in South Delhi and talked with
government officials (in the Chief Minister's Office) involved with the Bhagidari program. I
did not use a structured questionnaire; but I mostly tried to understand how development
works in their neighborhood were done, what worked, what did not, who they contacted for
services, what has changed after Bhagidari, etc. I went to Bhagidari meetings conducted at the
District level by representatives of the Delhi Government (i.e. the District Commissioner).
During this process, I also interviewed the local councilor who seemed to have done a lot of
work in this ward, especially in the middle/high income neighborhoods. This was a little
surprising for me because I had imagined a patron-client relationship between the low-
income residents in the ward and the councilor. Having grown up in this city, I know that
most middle-class residents don't even know their local councilor (it is not that the middle-
class does not depend on services provided by local governments, but that they use
bureaucratic channels for accessing the State). So why did the councilor bother to work in
their neighborhoods? What was driving this change? And what did it mean for demand-
making for the poor who traditionally access political representatives? These were questions
I wanted to explore further the next time I went to Delhi.
During this period, I had used the RWA umbrella organizations mostly to get
contacts of RWAs and talked with some of the members. I did not think that their activities
would be very useful for my research, but they were doing was interesting anyway. There
were a number of federations of RWAs in Delhi in various zones, but two large groups. One
was called 'People's Action' and another 'Delhi Residents Welfare Association Joint Front'.
These groups had managed to organize RWAs (that were traditionally concerned with issues
only within the boundaries of their neighborhoods) at the city level. They started working in
2003-04 and within a very short duration of time had become the principal 'voice of the
citizen' in local media. This was very interesting for me. Since they [People's Action and
their RWA wing United Residents Joint Action (URJA)] had helped me find contacts, I felt
obliged to attend one of their 'protest marches' in downtown against reservation for
backward classes (Scheduled Castes/ Tribes and other minorities4) in higher education: elite
engineering and management schools - Indian Institute of Technology (IITs) and Indian
Institute of Management (IIMs). The 'activists' were mostly RWAs members from the city,
many of who were also alums of these schools. But the protest wasn't even on a city issue,
leave alone a neighborhood issue! The President of the organization later told me that he
was trying to 'get the middle-class in a habit of protesting'. My hunch was that the group was
also trying to get the middle-class to join formal politics. The plan in January 2007 was still
to find out more about the relationship between the councilor and RWAs, rather the
activities of the two organizations.
4 Backward castes: (Scheduled Castes (SC) and Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Castes (OBC) are provided
reservation in the public sector as a means of affirmative action by the Constitution of India
Question over January 2007: How does institutionalization of community-led
development affect traditional channels of participation and demand making for the
poor?
This time I had a more structured research plan (mostly because I didn't have a lot of
time and needed to get a lot of information very fast!). I selected two wards: revisiting the
ward in south Delhi I worked on during summer (this was a ward with mostly middle to
high income neighborhoods with some scattered slum populations) and the second was in
north Delhi (towards the outskirts of the city where many unauthorized/slum and
resettlement colonies were located and had a sizable population in planned neighborhoods
represented by RWAs). Another reason I chose this ward was because my friends (working
in an NGOs) got me in touch with 'facilitators' who worked in the slum settlements in north
Delhi and knew the headmen (pradhans) and other people I could interview. Around that
time, 'People's Action' had announced that RWAs would form ward committees and might
stand for the upcoming municipal elections and north Delhi was one of the selected wards.
So this seemed like an interesting ward to study! This time, I interviewed RWAs, the
municipal councilor, Members of Legislative Assembly in both wards, as well as members of
RWA umbrella organizations (two main bodies), government officials (those currently
working on the project and the person who initiated the program), the NGOs associated
with implementing 'Bhagidar', independent researchers, and the Chief Minister.
I spent two weeks in December filling in data gaps in the south Delhi ward and in
selecting the second case study. This was towards the end of 2006: time for the media to
reflect on the main developments of the year. Hindustan Times (a leading English daily)
called 2006 the 'year of the middle-class'. NDTV (a news channel) voted two activists as
'people of the year'. This was in wake of the Jessica Lal and Priyadarshini Matto murder
cases where the activism by the middle class resulted in the reopening the cases and bringing
accused to justices. This research did not only concern a governance issue in Delhi, but
5 In both these cases, the victims were murdered by family members of powerful politicians/ bureaucrats. In
February 2006, almost all witnesses turned hostile resulting in the acquittal of all the nine accused in the Jessica
Lal murder that took place in 1999. This is typical of many of high profile crimes in India where the rate of
conviction is less than 30%, but what was unusual was the public outrage that has followed the acquittals led by
the middle class and widely supported by the media. This included protest rallies, candle light vigils, mobile text
messaging campaigns etc. One television channel collected more than 200,000 messages and petitions asking
the president of India to intervene in the matter. Because of this pressure, the case was finally reopened. In
December 2006, the court convicted the son of a governing Congress party politician of the murder. Observers
say the case encouraged sustained media campaigns and public protests which have resulted in other cases
reflected a much broader phenomenon. Before starting fieldwork again in January, I spent
about three weeks in Lesotho for another class. Since I had so much free time (with nothing
to do in the village after work!), I prepared for fieldwork: wrote questionnaires for political
representatives, RWAs, slum settlements, government officials, RWA umbrella groups etc. I
also read up on the history of the middle-class in India and the evolution of municipal
government, especially the working of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the role of
councilors.
This middle class activism is part of a larger socio-economic phenomenon and the
rise of neighborhood associations is perhaps a manifestation of it at from the perspective of
local governance. From Spring 2007 onwards, I have been thinking more about the impact
that middle-class associations have had on public policy decision making and formal political
processes. This is reflected in the research question I elaborated on earlier in Section 1.6.
being reopened and convictions secured. In October '06, the son of a former senior policeman was convicted
of raping and murdering Delhi student Priyardishini Mattoo in 1996.
Chapter 2
How associations of the Middle Class and
the Urban Poor Access the State
This chapter describes the different channels through which middle-class
associations and residents of informal settlements access the State. I explore the
history, membership characteristics, and methods of operation of neighborhood
associations in Delhi. The Government of Delhi institutionalized citizen-
government participation with these neighborhood associations in 2000 through a
program called 'Bhagidari'. I study the factors that led to implementation of the
program and the administrative mechanisms through which it was implemented.
This chapter lays the contextual and theoretical background for understanding how
middle-class associations have come to dominate public policy discourse in the city
that I explore in the successive chapters.
2.1 Associations of the Middle Class: Resident Welfare Associations
For the purpose of this research, I concentrate on associations of the middle class
engaged in delivery of services in urban areas, either through their own resources or through
government agencies. In Delhi and in many other large Indian cities, neighborhood
associations, called Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) are engaged in this function.
Neighborhood associations are on the rise not only in India, but also in countries in Latin
America, the United States and China. In these countries, however, neighborhood
associations represent a trend towards privatization of service delivery. In China, for
example, homeowner associations are encouraged by the Ministry of Construction on
grounds of 'greater efficiency in provision of community services' (Deng, 2004). In the case
of United States, Nelson (2003) even suggests that states should replace municipalities with
private community associations. His analysis is based on the astronomical growth of
developer-designed community associations since 1970, with about half of the new housing
units in major metropolitan areas being built within the legal framework of private collective
ownership (Fishel, 2003 and 2005). Neighborhood associations in India, however, continue
to access the State for services. The rise of neighborhood associations in India is linked to
larger socio-economic changes associated with the growth of the middle class after the
economic reforms after early nineties
Neighborhood associations are primarily middle-class in nature, but prevalent in
both planned neighborhoods and unauthorized colonies6 (many of which are not poor).
Harriss (2005b) describes RWAs as essentially neighborhood management committees in
apartment blocks or housing colonies to which the residents are required to pay regular
charges, and which organize and pay for security and look after maintenance of common
resources. They also engage with city governments over issues such as access to public
services: water, electricity and street lighting, roads maintenance and drainage, solid waste
management, and parking. After the launch of the Bhagidari program in Delhi (see section
2.4), many RWAs have been carrying out additional tasks like securing payment and
collection of water bills, electricity meter reading, house tax collection, the supervision of
sanitation services, and the maintenance of community parks and community halls in their
neighbourhoods. Legally, RWAs are registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860
that applies to civic associations of all kinds (NGOs, housing societies, community based
organizations, etc). RWAs in Delhi Development Authority (DDA) Group housing are
registered under the Apartment Owner's Act of DDA.
2.1.1 History of RWAs in Delhi
Researchers argue that Resident Welfare Associations were the first form of
collective action in Delhi following Indira Gandhi's assassination7 in 1984 as security
concerns heightened in both Sikh and non-Sikh neighborhoods in the capital8 . This was also
the beginning of gated neighborhoods in the city. The primary function of RWAs during this
period pertained to security: construction of boundary walls, paying for security guard, etc.
67% of the RWAs in the city were formed in the 80s (Harriss, 2006), although it must be
noted that a number of new RWAs have come into existence after Harriss' study as a result
6 For example, the Urban Development Department of the Government of Delhi invited applications from
RWAs in unauthorized areas in 2005 to consider them for regularization
Source: "Government seeking detailing for regularization: unauthorized colonies to come out in
droves", The Statesman, New Delhi, 31 January 2005
7 Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards in October 1984. After her death, anti-Sikh
pogroms engulfed Delhi and other cities in northern India, resulting in over two thousand seven hundred
deaths, mostly innocent Sikhs.
8 Personal interview with Prof. Sridharan, Department of Urban Planning, School of Planning and
Architecture, New Delhi [Delhi, December 2006]; and Lalit Batra, Independent Researcher [New Delhi,
January 2007]
of Bhagidari and related developments. Another reason for the growth of RWAs in the 1980s
was the development of DDA housing during this period. The DDA Act9 made it
mandatory for group housing colonies to set up a management committee that could take
care of maintenance of common facilities when the housing units were handed over to
residents.
It is difficult to draw any generalization about the trajectory of growth of RWAs in
Delhi. The general perception about RWAs is that most existed only on paper (since it was a
requirement in many DDA housing) and have become active only in the last 5-10 years.
However during my interviews with RWA members, I discovered that many RWAs have
always been active not only in dealing with security issues, but also in bargaining with
government agencies with regard to access to services in their neighborhoods. This is
especially true for housing colonies developed during the 80s that during the time were
located at the outskirts of the city where infrastructure facilities like water supply,
transportation (bus service), internal roads, etc had not been completely developed. I was
told that some RWAs had worked extensively during this period to lobby with political
representatives and government officials for such service provision. Some RWAs have been
formed and/or become active since the Bhagidari program was implemented. Regardless of
how active RWAs were in problem solving, what is clear is that their realm of influence was
restricted to the boundaries of their neighborhoods until the launch of the Bhagidari
program. In the last five years, they are assumed an important role in public policy discourse
and are projected as the prime representatives of citizens by the Indian media. This period
also saw formation of horizontal networks amongst RWAs at the city level (see chapter 3
and 4).
2.1.2 Membership and Methods of Operation
a) Membership
There are a few distinctive characteristics of RWA members that run across these
associations irrespective of the socio-economic backgrounds of the neighborhoods they
represent. One, most of the members are retired professionals (and some are housewives),
9 Much of the planned housing (both plotted and group housing) in Delhi is developed by DDA. Group
Housing in this context is apartment style housing (more than one floor) developed by DDA. Plotted housing
(similar to single-family homes in the US) is privately constructed, although infrastructure is laid out by the
DDA.
because of the amount of time this work entails. Their occupations generally reflect the
occupational characteristic of the residents, but in the neighborhoods in the high income
ward in South Delhi, retired corporate managers, army officers and bureaucrats dominate the
membership. In the North Delhi ward, most RWA members are school teachers and in mid-
level service sector jobs. But in both the wards professionals, as opposed to traders,
dominate the membership even though the neighborhood population may be partly
comprised of traders.
Their incentive to join in both wards is largely similar, but there are some interesting
nuances. In the South Delhi ward, I was struck by the number of ex-army men and high-
level managers in RWAs. The rationale behind it is that these members believed that this was
their chance to give back to society having spent most of their lives away from 'public life'. I
didn't interview any bureaucrats during my fieldwork, but most often they [or their family
members] were coaxed to become officers because of their preexisting networks within
some of these public agencies. Many of the RWA members in the North Delhi ward
however, came from backgrounds of public service: as teachers, trade union leaders, etc.
What defines their backgrounds is an ability to manage people and projects. I was surprised
at how some of these offices had begun to acquire the structure of real organizations: well
defined agendas, division of labor, computerized management, deadlines etc. Most members
take great pride in their work (even though it does not involve any financial benefits) and
believe that it is important public service. For example, it is normal for many RWAs to put
in 3-5 hours per day on neighborhood related work.
Being a member of an RWA gives social recognition to its members, both within and
outside the neighborhood and adds to their social capital [both individual and collective].
For example, influential people in the neighborhood have high individual social capital
[vertical networks within the government]. Being in the association helps develop collective
social capital by building horizontal connection within the neighborhood. They do that
mostly because it brings goodwill, but many RWA members also leverage their position in
the association to have development work carried out next to their houses, for example,
improving the lane, park or boundary wall next to their house. Membership reinforces their
networks within the government and also brings them further recognition through the
Bhagidari program. Most recently, RWA members have become the focus of media attention
as the prime representatives of citizens.
b) Methods of Operation
Each RWA has its own constitution that governs its rules of membership, elections,
office positions and terms of office. These do not vary significantly across neighborhoods.
Some RWAs, however, exclude renters from membership. There are usually 11 office
positions [which include President, Vice-President, Secretary, Joint Secretary and Treasurer].
Most collect an annual/monthly fee from residents which is used to maintain public
facilities.
RWA views are considered public opinion by the media and government agencies.
RWAs are commonly believed to be democratic since the members are elected through
majority vote. But I would describe RWAs as voluntary bodies rather than the next level of
democracy, although they may still be representative. This is because the number of
nominations for office posts is usually less than the number of positions. Residents are often
coaxed to nominate themselves by other and/or preceding officers. True, there are elections,
but the turnout for Annual General Body Meetings, where broad issues concerning the
neighborhood are discussed and some decided upon and annual elections for officers held, is
less than 5-10% of the total membership. In comparison, the voter turnout in local
municipal elections in middle class wards of the order of 30-40%. There are very few
instances when a position is really contested. I discovered that most of these associations
were representative, nonetheless, since they worked as per the requests of residents in the
neighborhood1 °.
RWAs use multiple means of service delivery, the State being the most important
source. But many RWAs generate funds internally. This fee ranges from a few hundred
rupees to about 2500 rupees annually for some areas. Payment to RWAs is not legally
binding, but most pay due to social pressure by RWA members and other residents. A recent
trend in service delivery is the involvement of private sector either through the means of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or for advertising rights in return for maintenance of
public facilities. For example, in 2000 more than 80 RWAs signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and the corporate
sector for maintenance and development of city parks across the city". Many high income
o1 This is reflected by complaint registers that many RWAs maintain. The daily work schedule of RWAs
members revolves around fixing those complaints [Interviews with RWA members in North and South Delhi]
1" "RWAs to develop 80 parks", The Hindu, New Delhi, August 17, 2000
neighborhoods use private corporations, most of which wish to set up their franchises in
their neighborhoods, to provide public services. This includes maintenance of parks, back
lanes, sponsoring annual events, etc for advertising rights in the neighborhood or in return
for contact information of the residents/marketing opportunities in these events. This is a
relatively new development in Indian cities.
2.2 Associations of the Urban Poor
The primary focus of this research was to study the organization and impact of
neighborhood associations, almost all of which are middle class in nature and lie in the
planned parts of the city. But in order to understand how associations of the middle-class
impact the urban poor, it was important to understand associational life in informal
settlements. For this purpose, I draw mostly from empirical studies on informal settlements
in Delhi and elsewhere in India. I also add to my understanding of service delivery in such
settlements through interviews with leaders and residents in regularized, unauthorized, slum
(JJ) clusters, and resettlement colony, and with political representatives and NGOs working
in these areas.
'Associational life', as understood in middle-class neighborhoods governed by a
constitution and clear organizational structures, is generally weak in informal settlements.
Instead residents are represented by local headmen called pradhans'. The title 'pradhan' is one
that recognizes someone who has some clout in a locality, and who is able to exercise some
influence (Harriss, 2005a). This person is usually not elected through any organized process
by the community, but one mostly likely to have taken initiative at times of crisis or need in
the settlement. Subsequently, he or she is called upon for other problems that residents of
the area might be facing. Sustained performance in problem-solving establishes him or her as
the informal leader of the community12 . The primary means of problem-solving is through
bargaining with political representatives. A 'pradban' acts as an intermediately between elected
political representatives and/or government officials and slum residents. This person is
approached by political parties because of his/her horizontal networks in the settlement and
because of the credibility he/she enjoys in the community. Rao, Woolcock and Jha (2007)
conclude that links to political parties, a proven track record, education and network
12 Personal interview with facilitators from the Center for Urban and Regional Excellence (CURE); and Pradhan
in unauthorized settlement, Rohini Sector 17 [Delhi January 2007]
entrepreneurship, and claims to a democratic mandate are the primary sources of legitimacy
regardless of how pradbans acquire their power 3.
Edelman and Mitra (2006) describe this process as a client-patron relationship
between slum dwellers and politicians where tenure and basic amenities are exchanged for
votes 'with the expectation of receiving large scale support at election time'. The pradhan is
the person who gathers support for politicians by boosting attendance at rallies and assuring
sources of votes. Most often, this transaction also involves some personal (material and
political benefits) for the pradhan. Pradhans also work closely with party workers, while many
pradhans are themselves formally associated with political parties. Political leaders with
different ideological disposition have often rallied with the poor and slum dwellers, partly
because the latter constitute their vote bank (Oldenburg, 1978).
Edelman and Mitra (2006) draw a distinction between tenure security and service
provision in slums, although the role of political representatives is central in both. The
process of tenure security is described as a process of negotiation between local political
representatives and pradhans in which a semi-legal passport to stay in the city is obtained by
issuing voter's identity and ration cards'14 to participate in the public distribution system. In
certain periods, particularly on the eve of elections, pradhans demand regularization of slum
colonies. Basic services, like water connections or tube-wells, sanitation, approach roads,
sewerage, etc, are also provided through a similar process of negotiation, also during the eve
of elections. Political parties, no matter what their limitations and weaknesses, remain the
primary channel through which poorer people access the State (Harriss, 2005a). Voting
patterns for local municipal elections in Delhi indicate a strong correlation between increase
in voter turnouts and the extent of deprivations experienced, indicating that poor residents
see political representatives as a important channel for making their voices heard (Baud,
Sridharan, Pfeffer, 2006).
It is important to note that while these informal leaders (pradhans) are accessible to all
slum dwellers, government officials are most accessed by the wealthy and the well-connected
(Rao, Woolcock and Jha, 2007 and Harriss, 2005a). Rao, Woolcock and Jha (2007) note that
13 Rao, Woolcock and Jha (2007) observe that in ethnically homogenous settlements, leadership institutions are
transplants from traditional village panchayat (local self government) systems. Heterogeneous settlements
acquire leadership roles through multiple means, education and political networks being the two most
important determinants.
14 A ration card is a card issued by a government to poor sections of the society. The card allows the holder to
obtain certain goods (usually food) at highly subsidized prices.
bureaucrats and politicians are most likely to interact with pradhans which further reinforces
their position within the community. We should, however, be careful to not overemphasize
the position of the pradhan. During my fieldwork, I found that there are often multiple
pradhans in a settlement, often defined by their political affiliations. These affiliations shift
with time, depending on which party is able to offer more concessions. All pradhans have
been involved in problem-solving in the community at some point of time, but usually no
one person enjoys absolute support amongst the residents. Competition between pradhans
should theoretically result in larger cumulative concessions for the residents (and maybe it
does), but workers in slums pointed out that often a status quo is reached and most of the
concessions end up being short term material gains. For example, residents told me that
instead of providing services, most pradhans and politicians deliver blankets, cash, liquor, etc
before elections.
I also observed that associations begin to emerge as these settlements develop [with
time, or when they acquire tenure]. Individual pradhans are prominent in slum/ JhuggiJhopris
(JJ) clusters while resettlement colonies and unauthorized colonies have pradhans as well as
registered associations of some kind. Residents in unauthorized settlements are usually
financially better off and demographically more diverse (in terms of age structures, gender
etc) as opposed to JJ colonies that primarily comprise of male migrant workers"s. Most
unauthorized colonies are also older than JJ settlements and also more developed. This
allows certain individuals, usually retired workers, to spend more time in welfare activities in
unauthorized settlements. These associations are not as formally structured as RWAs, but
the members are typically more educated than other residents, and many had been in
government service earlier. These individuals understand the needs of the community but
their experience in government jobs, however insignificant it might be, familiarizes them
with government procedures and allows them to converse in the language of the
government agencies. For example, a registered welfare society in an unauthorized
settlement I visited in North Delhi (Rohini) was headed by a retired policeman. Having
served in the Delhi Police for more than thirty years, he was aware of official paperwork and
procedures required for doing development work. He now regularly visits engineers in the
15 This is because slums settlements/ JJ colonies are squatter communities. Unauthorized settlements on the
other hand have come up because of unauthorized sale of land by private developers or landowners. Many
unauthorized settlements are also poor, but economic conditions are generally better than JJ clusters.
MCD Zonal office to check the status of tenders for construction of roads, drains, etc
commissioned for his neighborhood, even though the work itself is carried out through the
instructions of the local political representative (councilor or MLA)
2.3 Access to the State: Difference between RWAs and pradhans
"Only the poor agitate, the rich operate..."
Civil Society Activist, Former Civil Servant, Chennai
(Harriss, 2005b)
Surprisingly, although RWAs and pradhans represent completely different parts of the
city, they share some similarities. First, both institutions are essentially voluntary; RWA
members and the pradhan are most often not really elected. Yet most often they tend to be
representative of residents in either settlement. In middle class neighborhoods this is
reflected by RWA work plans. Multiple pradhans in slums ensure that the pradhans that not
able to deliver would be substituted by another. Most pradhans and RWA members tend to
have better networks in the government agencies than other residents. Pradhans have
networks with politicians within the government, RWAs mostly know bureaucrats. The
reason why ex-civil servants are often coaxed to become RWA officers further supports this
argument. The main difference between RWAs and pradhans however lies in the
mechanisms they use to access the State.
RWAs use multiple means of accessing the State, through public officials at various
levels in the agency and political representatives. There are two important distinctions
between the nature of interaction between political representatives and residents of middle
class neighborhoods and the urban poor. One, in informal settlements (as noted earlier) the
main process of bargaining between the politicians and residents takes place prior to the
election. This is because the urban poor influence political outcomes directly through ballots,
as opposed to middle-class neighborhoods that can influence policy through judicial and
bureaucratic channels. The second difference is at the level at which interaction between the
two groups takes place. Residents of slum settlements, although known to have networks
with high level politicians, often interact with local political representatives. Middle class
associations on the other hand bargain directly with top politicians and bureaucrats. Within
the middle class, income and networks determine the level of government that respective
RWAs are able to access.
One may argue that this difference in the process of political-bargaining is based on
structures of legality that often define middle-class neighborhoods'6 (as opposed to squatter
settlements). This is true to an extent, but a larger reason behind this is networks that
middle-class residents have in government agencies. For example, the MCD estimates that
70-80% of the city's buildings have unauthorized constructions, many of which are in
planned parts of the city. This is clearly a violation of the law, but RWAs in Vasant Kunj, a
middle-class neighborhood in South Delhi for example, bargained with government officials
for concessions regarding unauthorized construction. This process included meetings of
more than 100 RWAs in the area with the Union Minister for Urban Development and
senior officials of the DDA' 7, as opposed to negotiating with local politicians ahead of
elections. This is also an example of collective action by RWAs on a localized single issue
prior to organizing at a massive scale that took place in 2005. In other instances demolitions
of unauthorized construction in middle class neighborhoods have been stalled because of
informal networks between residents of these areas with government officials and
politicians".
2.4 New forms of Accessing the State: Bhagidari
Bhagidari" is a 'program of partnership' between government agencies in Delhi and
citizens (GNTCD, 2006). The 'government agencies' include the Government of Delhi and
its departments, local municipalities (Municipal Corporation of Delhi and New Delhi
Municipal Council), Delhi Development Authority, and utility agencies and companies
16 Chatterjee (2004) for example argues that the reason why squatters are not given any kind of 'legitimacy' by
government authorities is because that would threaten the entire structure of legally held property
17 "Mr. Jagmohan [Minister for Urban Development, Gol] declared that no action - in terms of demolition, notices
or allotment cancellation -would be taken for any unauthorized or illegal construction... he asked the RWAs
to bring in concrete proposals after duly being passed by their associations on what should be done with the
unauthorized constructions and how much relaxation in rules and regulation of the building by-laws should be
given.... The announcement was welcomed by the RWAs, which participated in the interactive session with the
Minister and DDA top brass."
Source: "A breather for DDA residents", The Hindu, New Delhi, June 26, 2000
18 For example, this is a case of demolition of illegal construction ordered by the High Court in Defense
Colony "...the drive was "deliberately slow" because of pressure from influential people having stakes in such
buildings.. .Throughout the day, top officials in the MCD received a large number of calls from politicians,
senior bureaucrats and influential people asking them to "spare" their properties."
Source: "MCD drive a non-starter", The Hindu, New Delhi, Sep 21, 2004
19 Bhagidari means 'collaborative partnership' in Hindi
(Delhi Jal Board and Power Distribution Companies). 'Citizens' were represented by
neighborhood associations, called Resident Welfare Associations (RWA), Market and Trader
Associations (MTA), Industrial Associations, Village Groups and NGOs (GNCTD, 2006).
This is the first such program started by a government in any city in India. The main focus
of the program however has been on RWAs. It is important to note that only RWAs from
the planned parts of the city, all of which are middle class in nature, were part of the
program. Although Bhagidari has diversified to other sectors like education, health, industry
etc in the last seven years, RWAs continue to be the only institutions that represent
neighborhoods. The program started with 20 RWAs in 2000 and has grown to more than
1900 RWAs in seven years. The implementation of the program was carried by a
professional organization called Asian Center for Organization Research and Development
(ACORD) that specialized in change management in large organizations. Implementation
mechanisms included workshops with RWAs and government agencies and institution of
special 'cells' within each of the participating government agency. The intended objectives of
the Bhagidari program , as laid out the Government of Delhi (GNCTD, 2006) are as follows:
* To empower the common citizens to have a greater say in planning and developing
of his neighborhood
* To evolve a joint forum of citizens and service providers for developing strategies by
consensus for better maintenance of public assets
* To develop a sense of ownership and commitment among the citizens and the
official through joint preparation of strategies and action plans
The program is largely seen as successful as reflected by the number of national and
international awards that it has received, including the UN Public Service Award in 200520.
This perception of success has influenced policies on governance at both state and national
levels in India and led to launching of similar programs. While the program does reflect how
city governments are becoming more responsive to citizens, the political implications of the
program have not been very well understood. I have discussed the impact of Bhagidari in
Chapter 3.
20 Other awards were presented by Government of India (2001), Commonwealth Agency for Public
Administration and Management (2002 & 2006), Sao Paulo Municipal Government (2003), UN HABITAT
(2004), UN Economic and Social Affairs (2005)
2.5 Bhagidari and RWAs
There are two reasons why RWAs were chosen for implementation of the program.
The first concerns the issue of scale: first do what is simpler, and then expand; the second is
based on the concept of legality. Bhagidari was started as an experiment by the Government
of Delhi. The idea was to start small and later look for avenues for expansion. RWAs were
the only institutions that represented citizens at the neighborhood level. It allowed the Delhi
Government to build on institutions that already existed21 . Since these organizations were
already involved in civic issues of their respective neighborhoods, it gave a common entry
point to begin this process. With the absence of formal representative associations (like
RWAs) in slum settlements, organizing deliberative meetings is difficult in slums. The
organization that conducted Bhagidari workshops believed that such a model would not be
appropriate for slum areas since the needs of slum residents are basic and obvious which do
not require participative processes22.It is interesting to note that only RWAs in the planned
part of the city were included of this program, although these institutions are also prevalent
in middle class but unauthorized colonies. This was because it is bureaucratically and
ideologically difficult to implement this program in unauthorized and slum settlements.
Issues of development in such areas 'inevitably bring up issues about land tenure' and 'no
civic agency will carry out any developmental work where land titles are in questione. So
although government agencies continue to provide basic amenities like water supply, street
lighting and pavements in slum settlements, they want to avoid negotiations that may result
in provision of land titles. This rationale is well summarized by Chatterjee (2004): 'If
squatters were to be given any kind of legitimacy by government authorities in their illegal
occupation of public or private lands, then the entire structure of legally held property would
be threatened'.
2.6 Genesis: Factors behind Implementation
The Bhagidari program is radical in the sense that such an initiative to institutionalize
citizen-government participation [by a government agency] has never been tried at a large
21 Personal interview with Mr. Regunathan, Principal, Secretary to the Chief Minister in 2000; and Kiron
Wadhera, President and CEO ACORD [Delhi, February 2007]
22 Personal interview with Kiron Wadhera, President and CEO ACORD [Delhi, February 2007]
23 Personal interview with Special Secretary to Chief Minister [Delhi, July 2006]and NGO Center for Urban and
Regional Excellence (CURE) [Delhi, December 2006]
scale in any Indian city before. There are two important factors behind the implementation
of the Bhagidari program. One, the program gained support from both senior political leaders
and bureaucrats, who then made institutional changes within various government agencies
for implementation of the program. Second (and more important) is the unique institutional
environment of Delhi that is dominated by institutions of the Central Government. Bhagidari
is a mechanism that Delhi Government used to exert its presence in the city.
2.6.1 Political and Administrative Support
Bhagidari is believed to be the brainchild of the Principal Secretary24 to the Chief
Minister in 200025. The idea was to implement the agenda on 'involving citizens in
governance' as listed in the Congress Manifesto, the party in power. Senior bureaucrats in
the government supported this concept because they expected citizen participation to
improve responsiveness of government officials and local politicians by creating an
accountability mechanism. It was also believed that decision making by local politicians is
usually not representative of most of the ward population 26. This was because 'elected
politicians represent only majority vote of the population that votes in local elections that
take place every five years when voter turnouts are not even very high'. Further public
participation in governance in India has been low because of problems associated with
implementation of the 74" Constitutional Amendment Act27 (see section 2.5.2)
But there are many programs that are recommended by policy analysts and civil
servants that are unable to find political support. Why was it that the Chief Minister not only
supported this idea, but took personal interest in its implementation by creating special
'Bhagidari Cells' in all government agencies in the city? The program has come to embody the
Delhi Government now. There are two main reasons why the Chief Minister has supported
the program. The first reason is because she has had a history of implementing progressive
public policies. This includes conversion of all public transport in the city (buses, and para-
24 A civil servant of the Indian Administrative Service
2 5 Interview with Kiron Wadhera, President and CEO ACORD [Delhi, February 2007]
"...considered an officer of high integrity and efficiency, Mr. Regunathan was also the main force behind the
successful implementation of the Bhagidari Scheme of the Delhi"
Source: "Regunathan takes over as Chief Secretary of Delhi", The Hindu, New Delhi, July 1, 2004
26 I have observed from many interviews that bureaucrats generally hold this opinion, and to an extent this
statement reflects the general opinion about local politicians in Delhi and elsewhere in India
27 Personal interview with Mr. Regunathan, Personal Secretary to Chief Minister 2000 [New Delhi, February
2007]
transit like auto-rickshaws and taxis) to Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) systems which
improved the air quality of the city substantially2 8 . Bhagidari was intended as a measure to
improve governance through citizen participation2 9. Leadership ,however, explains only part
of story. A more important reason is the unique political and institutional environment of
Delhi.
2.6.2 Institutional Environment of Delhi
Unlike other State governments, the Government of Delhi can exert very little direct
control over the working of government agencies in the city. Most of these agencies are
directly controlled by Government of India (GoI). The New Delhi Municipal Council
(NDMC) and Delhi Development Authority (DDA) are under the Ministry of Urban
Development, Government of India (Gol). The MCD, although an autonomous body, is
controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) GoI through amendments in the MCD
Act. The Delhi Police is also under MoHA. GoI appoints the Chief Secretary of the Delhi
Government and the Commissioners of the Delhi Police and Municipal Corporation of
Delhi respectively.
Government of Delhi
Member of
Legislative Assembly
Delhi Admin.
Delhi Jal Board
I UIUUMS Municipal Councilors
Figure 2.1: Administrative setup of the National Capital Territory of Delhi3"
28 Until 2000, Delhi was one of the most polluted cities in the world. The policy on CNG drew international
recognition.
29 Interview with Sheila Dikshit, Chief Miinister of Delhi [New Delhi, February 2007]30 This is a simplified version of the institutional structure of Delhi. Only key government agencies (relevant to
this study) are included in the chart. There are more than 120 public bodies that function within this territory
(lain, 2005).
-·---- ·
On the legislative side, the Government of Delhi cannot introduce any bill without
the consent of the Lieutenant Governor who appointed by the Government of India (Gol).
Delhi is empowered with legislative powers, but had no direct control over Public Order,
Police and Land 31. The Parliament of India can make any law related to Union Territories
and has the authority to nullify a law made by the legislative assembly (Bagchi, 2003). The
key agencies under the Delhi Government are the Delhi Jal Board (DJB), power companies:
DISCOM (BSES and NDPL, previously a state corporation called Delhi Vidyut Board), and
the Delhi Transport Corporation. This has two major implications.
a) Bhagidariand the Constitutional Amendment Act
The first implication relates to the institutional environment of Delhi with respect to
federal legislations. The first major initiative in decentralization in urban governance in India
was the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CCA). The act laid the framework to
incorporate changes in the organization, functions, and jurisdiction of the urban local
bodies32. It also provided for the constitutional recognition of local bodies for the first time.
Although the CCA was enacted in 1992, apart from conducting local elections and some
devolution of functions and finances to local bodies implementation of the Act as been
limited. It is interesting to note that the act was initiated by the federal government and was
not a result demands for greater autonomy by the state or local governments. Heitzman in
Harriss (2006) notes that 'For most public administrators in India, the movement towards
decentralization seemed a grim necessity or a historical trend, rather than a positive good ... '
The Act also required constitution of 'Wards Committees' (WCD) comprising of one
or more wards for management of services and infrastructure at the local level. This
committee was to include local political representatives and residents of the respective wards
to encourage participation of citizens and citizen groups in local governance. But with the
exception of two States, West Bengal and Kerala, both of which have been run by strong
communist governments for many years, decentralization (and particularly creation of ward
31 The government of India has significant influence over the administration in Delhi, not only because it had
been a Union Territory but also because it is the capital city. Also, mega-cities are generally considered too
important to be left totally to local bodies as they are required to perform functions vis-i-vis the regional and
even the national economy (Kundu, 2003).
32 For example, the Act made it mandatory for urban local governments to conduct democratic elections,
failing which the State and Central government could withdraw transfer of grants to these organizations. The
12th Schedule of the Act listed 18 functions that were recommended to be devolved to municipalities.
committees) has been difficult. The ambiguity in the Act regarding the size of the
constituency, and criteria and procedures for selection of its members3 3 resulted in the
creation of defunct WCDs in most cities. The institutional environment of Delhi, described
earlier, makes implementation of the act even more difficult. The strong presence of the
federal government in the city and now the newly formed legislative assembly leaves very
little political space for another
level of government that could
involve citizens. The limited
decision making power in the
capital is shared amongst political
representatives from three levels
of government (highlighted in
yellow in the figure 2.1):
Government of India [Members
of Parliament], Delhi Government
Iv'Iemters ot Legslianve Louncul, Figure 2.2 One of the many displays at the
elected representatives from the Bhagidari Utsav at the Trade
Exhibition Ground in Delhi ganuary 2007]
Municipal Corporation of Delhi
[Councilors] amongst a host of technocratic institutions34. In Delhi, this has translated into
creation of Ward Committees for populations of as high as 1.25 million people per
committee, which could not ensure proximity and accountability between the people and
their elected representatives (Kundu, D., 2006). Bhagidani institutionalized citizen
participation at the level of the neighborhood without changing any formal political
structures. Hence it was in a way able to fill a space that formal policies on decentralization
instituted by the center were not able to do so. The 'need' for this space is however a
function of larger socio-economic conditions brought about after liberalization.
33The Constitution of India consists of three lists: a central list of subjects over which the central government
has exclusive control, a state list of subjects with exclusive control by the state governments, and a concurrent
list of subjects. Urban development is listed as a 'State Subject', which makes functions on 121t Schedule under
the discretion of State Governments
3 Interview with Mr. Yadav, Special Secretary to Chief Minister [Chief Minister's Office, Delhi, July 2006]
b) Bhagidai as means of establishing Delhi Government presence
The Delhi Government has to constantly work under the shadow of institutions
created by the federal government. An important reason why Bhagidari found political
support was because it was one of the most visible means for the Chief Minister to publicize
the workings of her government. This gains even more significance since Bhagidari was
implemented when the major oppositions party BJP was in power at the Central
Government. This is reflected by the publicity campaign for the program for which a
multinational advertising agency was hired. Bhagidari posters and billboards are displayed all
over the city. Events like the annual Bhagidari festival are organized at a huge scale (see
Figure 2.2). Much of what the Delhi Government does now is under the rubric of 'Bhagidari'.
This is exemplified by the new insignia for the government: the 'bhagidari' logo hands
symbolizing partnership next to the tricolor 'Delhi Government'. All Delhi Government
documents, reports, public notices and even business cards of government officials bear the
Bhagidari sign. It is argued that the success of the program in the initial years was
instrumental in the Chief Minister being re-elected after her first term in office (see chapter
3). A spin-off of the publicity campaigns resulted in Resident Welfare Associations assuming
space in the media as representatives of the citizens.
2.7 Implementation
The implementation of the Bhagidari program was carried out by an organization
called ACORD that had had previous experience in change management in large
organizations like labor unions, large steel plants, etc. They employed the principles of 'large
group dynamics' and 'small group dynamics' in especially designed three-day 'workshops'.
The purpose of 'Bhagidari workshops' was to facilitate dialogue in large groups of 300-400
key stakeholders (RWAs and officials from government agencies). This large group was
further divided into twenty five to forty identical 'small groups'. These groups constituted of
members from various stakeholders of a particular area. 'Action teams' are formed on the
concluding day of the workshop for implementing the agreed solutions within a timeframe
(GNCTD, 2006). The purpose of these meetings was essentially consultative to draw up a
list of concrete issues or problems as perceived by the various stakeholders. Eight-nine
Bhagidari workshops are held in a year.
Officially, the Bhagidari program was structured into four phases. This included
'Planning' (anuary 2000 to June 2001), 'Decentralization' (uly 2001 to October 2002),
'Empowerment' (Nov 2002- Dec 2003) and 'Institutionalization' (an 2004 onwards). The
focus of the first phase was on awareness and building a critical mass of RWAs and
government department that would be part of the program. Four large workshops were
organization in this 'launch phase', three of which were with RWAs. Bhagidari workshops
during this phase were centralized at the "Bhagidari Cell" created in the Chief Minister's
Office (Gol, 2002).
In the second phase, the organization and management of the workshops
decentralized to the Deputy Commissioners of the nine revenue districts of the city. The
idea behind it was to 'create ownership at deeper levels in administration' and to involve a
greater number of RWAs in the process. More than 50% of citizen groups reported concrete
success due to Bhagidari during this phase. The Deputy Commissioner played a key role in
facilitating the 'partnership process' between citizens and officials. Other government
organizations like the MCD, DDA, DJB and Departments of Social Welfare and Education
(Government of Delhi) became part of the program (Gol, 2003).
In the third phase, the program was extended to rural areas and other related
programs like Bhagidari in Schools (Vidyalaya Kalyan Samities in Government Schools) were
implemented. The main focus of this phase was on the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
During this phase special units called 'Bhagidari Cells' were instituted in each of the
participating government agency. Also 'Nodal officers' in these agencies and government
departments were appointed as to remove roadblocks in their respective organizations for
smoothening of the implementation process. At the District level, monthly review meetings
were instituted to monitor feedback from RWAs and participating agencies. In the last
phase, the focus was on 'institutionalization' of the program through strengthening 'bhagidari
cells' and 'nodal officers' in the government agencies (GoilI, 2004)
The scope of Bhagidari has broadened much since; the focus earlier was primarily on
RWAs, now it has diversified to include programs with school children, environmental
campaigns, reforms in hospitals, programs for senior citizens etc. Some of these do not
involve RWAs, like developing industrial areas while some involve RWAs in non-traditional
roles, like helping in maintenance of local government schools and hospitals. From just 20
RWAs in 2000, the program has evolved to the extent that much of what the Delhi
Government does now is under the rubric of 'Bhagidar'. The following chapter discusses the
evolution of the program from a political lens. I discuss how Bhagidari influenced the
relationship between the Delhi Government and the Municipal Government and the
relationship between government agencies and RWAs.
Chapter 3
New forms of Accessing the State:
the Bhagidari Story retold...
This chapter examines the political impacts of the Bhagidari program. I look
at the evolution of the program as perceived by the various stakeholders (RWAs,
Delhi Government and other government agencies) and Chapter 2). I study the
impact of the program on service delivery and on the relationship between the
Government of Delhi and other government agencies involved in service delivery. I
also describe the ways in which the relationship between citizen-groups and
government agencies, especially political representatives, changed as an outcome of
the program.
3.1 Evolution of Bhagidari
The Bhagidari program was implemented in four phases as discussed in chapter two.
This included 'Planning' (anuary 2000 to June 2001), 'Decentralization' (uly 2001 to
October 2002), 'Empowerment' (Nov 2002- Dec 2003) and 'Institutionalization' (an 2004
onwards). But these 'official' phases were structured around the administrative mechanisms
through which the program was implemented. A more useful way of looking at its evolution
would be to study the ways in which perception of the program has changed in the eyes of
the various actors involved: government officials, RWAs, NGOs and the media. ACORD,
the organization involved in the conception and implementation of Bhagidari in its first five
year, reflected on these changes. They seemed to suggest that the program evolved in three
main phases: first was when there was sharp criticism of Bhagidari from the media and parts
of the government; second when the program gathered support from all its stakeholders and
with it national and international recognition; third, period of 'politicization' that saw
fragmentation of Resident Welfare Associations and Market Traders Associations, and
conflicts with the Bhagidari stakeholders and local political representatives 35. Later I
corroborated their analysis with newspaper reports. I agree with ACORD's understanding of
the first two phases, which I term 'period of skepticism' and 'feel-good period' respectively.
35 Personal interview with Kiron Wadhera, President and CEO ACORD and Professor George Koreth,
Chairman Board of Governors, ACORD [Delhi, February 2007]
But although the main political impacts of the program are observed in the last phase,
central to this change in power dynamics between different government institutions was
Resident Welfare Associations. They had grown in power especially in the last phase by
forming horizontal networks with other RWAs in the city in response to changes in
mechanisms in service delivery. I call this the 'period of the Rise of RWAs'.
3.1.1 Period of 'Skepticism'
"...launched in January 2000 by Delhi Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit, it was termed
an exercise in futility. Members of her Cabinet privately termed it a misadventure. And
Congress MLAs were upset at their rights being infringed upon. The Opposition BJP termed
it as misuse of official machinery36."
Bhagidari now is often cited as a success story in citizen participation in India. But
during its first two years (2000-2002), this initiative drew a lot of criticism, not only from the
media but also from parts of the administration, as reflected in the newspaper excerpt above.
Citizen groups and government officials thought that it was a waste of time and government
resources with no precedent to which they could anchor their expectations37. Neighborhood
associations were unhappy with the lack of cooperation from government officials, especially
outside the Delhi Administration"3 . Officials, usually junior level engineers and technicians,
who had to interact with residents on a day-to-day basis, were opposed to the program
because it translated into more work for them (see 3.2.2).
The Chief Minister however continued to be supportive of the program and this
translated into greater efforts by Delhi Administration to make it work. For example, during
the first two years, when the monitoring of the program was based in the Chief Minister's
Office, she supervised over the progress of the program personally. She also invited RWAs
to approach her directly in case government officials were not responsive39. During the
appraisal of her Council of Minister in 2002, Bhagidari was key on her agenda4 . The Delhi
Administration therefore took additional measures, like more meetings and interactive
36 "Congress waits to reap Bhagidari harvest", The Hindu, New Delhi, November 14, 2003
37 Personal interview with Kiron Wadhera, President and CEO ACORD [Delhi, February 2007]
"Bhagidari scheme draws flak", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 18, 2000
39 "Disaster control: CM reaches out to RWAs", The Hindu, New Delhi, May 05, 2002
40 "Sheila preparing Ministers' report card", The Hindu, New Delhi, November 03, 2002
sessions, with RWA representatives 'to set things right and eliminate the obstacles in the way
of the smooth functioning of the scheme41'.
During this period, the program was 'decentralized' to the Administrative Districts
(Bhagidari Phase II) and other government agencies, including the DDA, joined the
program42. The most important amongst these agencies was the participation of MCD, the
agency involved in most civic issues that concerned RWAs. It is interesting to note that the
participation of MCD followed the victory of the Congress Party in the municipal elections,
the party in power also in NCT Delhi,43. The next Phase in Bhagidari, Institutionalization, as a
result focused on the MCD to a great extent (as has been discussed in chapter 2).
3.1.2 The 'Feel Good' Period
"Fighting all odds within and outside her party, Delhi Chief Minister, Sheila Dikshit,
has not only proven herself to be an able administrator but also a scheming politician with
strong survival skills... the Bhagidari Scheme of the Chief Minister has been able to build a
huge chain of Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) bringing into focus the government-
citizen partnership at the grassroots level. The Bhagidari concept has been able to bring about
some sense of accountability in the set-up which has been ridden with corruption and
efficiency44."
Towards the end of 2002, Bhagidari gathered support across different stakeholders,
especially RWAs, and the media45. The Government of Delhi did not try many new things
with the program itself, but started publicizing the program in a big way. For example,
participation of federal government agencies was still weak in Bhagidari workshops and
meetings, but the achievements of the program were highlighted. This publicity included
41 "Bhagidari scheme draws flak", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 18, 2000
42 ,"...what could be termed as a major breakthrough in this endeavor for transferring power to the grassroots
level, the Delhi Government has been able to enlist the support of the Delhi police, DDA, RWAs and market
associations for implementing and monitoring various projects under the Bhagidari scheme. The Chief Minister,
is keen that the workshop ensures perfect coordination between the various wings of the administration and
the people at large. She is also actively taking part in the proceedings."
Source: "Bhagidari scheme gets a boost", The Hindu, New Delhi, February 02, 2001
43 "With the MCD under our control, it would now be possible to ensure better coordination and improved
development of the Capital." Sheila Dikshit, CM Delhi
Source: "Reverse count for NDA begins: Congress", The Hindu, New Delhi, March 28, 2002
"The Standing Committee Chairman of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Ram Babu Sharma, today said the
Congress party would go in for implementing the Bhagidari scheme of the Delhi Government".
Source: "MCD to pursue Bhagidart', The Hindu, New Delhi, May 18, 2002
44 "Sheila enters fifth year in office", The Hindu, New Delhi, December 03, 2002
45 "A popular scheme", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 17, 2002
"Many milestones, also potholes", The Hindu, New Delhi, December 30, 2002
announcement of the program under various Government of Delhi notifications and
advertisements in newspapers, and the Chief Minister herself glorifying the achievements of
the program in her public addresses46. The annual Bhagidari Festival (called Bhagidari Utsav)
was started in early 2004 in the trade-exhibition grounds in a huge scale. The best RWAs
were awarded 'Bhagidari prizes', which Delhi government officials and some RWAs argue is a
big incentive to conduct/monitor works in their respective neighborhoods. These awards
included cash prizes (from US$500-2,000 onwards) for best kept gardens, significant
improvements in sanitation, rainwater harvesting systems (which are subsidized by the Delhi
Government) etc.
Central to this period was the Assembly Elections for Delhi in 2004. The Bhagidari
program was advertised as one of the key achievements of the government, one they claimed
was 'taking the shape of a movement47'. During the course of this period, the program was
extended to a large population base48: the rural areas of Delhi with village groups and
industrial areas. The Chief Minister also promised to extend the program to slums and JJ
colonies in the city49, although this plan did not mature until the end of 2006. During this
period, the media was strongly in favor of the program, which translated into the creation of
a good image of the government especially since Bhagidari by now had formed the core of all
Delhi Government activities. The following newspaper excerpts illustrate this understanding:
"Political observers here are of the view that Ms. Dikshit holds sway over the
electorate due to good governance and visible developmental projects undertaken during her
five-year tenure. The Chief Minister has been able to establish a special rapport with the
Delhi electorate...And her standing with women and children has gained strength over the
last three years due to several initiatives taken by her Government including the
internationally recognized Bhagidari scheme"'.
46 Example of a public address by Sheila Dikshit: "Our focus has been on involving the citizens in day-to-day
governance and strengthening accountability at the grass-root level. The Administration has been made more
open, transparent and effective by bringing it closer to the people through the concept of Bhagidari."
Source: "Sheila never had it so good", The Hindu, New Delhi, May 13, 2003
47 "Govt. set to derive mileage from Assembly Session", The Hindu, New Delhi, March 17, 2003
"...the 'Bhagidar? scheme was flaunted as the policy that had set off a flurry of development initiatives in
transportation, power and water, created news jobs and visibly improved the quality of life in the Capital".
Source: "Vote for our 'positive message': Congress", The Hindu, New Delhi, November 30, 2003
48 Note that RWAs are one of the many participants in the Bhagidari program. They are however the only group
that represents neighborhoods. Other citizen groups represented occupations (like traders) or sectors (health,
industry etc)
49 "Team Delhi will deliver, promises Sheila", The Hindu, New Delhi, December 14, 2003
50 "Sheila still the best bet for Congress", The Hindu, New Delhi, October 10, 2003 and "Sheila completes full
term in office", The Hindu, New Delhi, December 03, 2003
"Ms. Dikshit emphasized that the Congress was confident of getting a second
endorsement from the people of Delhi and promised to serve their cause and provide even
better governance in the second innings...The Chief Minister said the "Bhagidari Scheme",
which started on a small scale and faced stiff resistance had come to be accepted as a major
successful initiative aimed at citizen-people partnership...Ms. Dikshit said the biggest
achievement of the Delhi Government during the past five years was that it had succeeded
in involving the people in the process of governance51".
"Having received national and international accolades, Bhagidari has made citizens
feel part of the administration and enabled the Congress Government to make inroads into
areas where the BJP had a strong presence - that is the middle class and the trading
community...Now the Congress is just waiting to reap the benefits in the elections. The
Chief Minister, who has turned the tide in favour of her party, said the growing support for
Bhagidari was a good sign. In fact, through RWAs. the party might be able to make a dent in
the traditional BJP vote bank in the cooperative group housing societies, residential colonies
and the trading community5 2".
The Chief Minister was voted back into power in 2004. Bhagidari was one of the
major reasons behind this victory: 'what was thought to be fanciful idea of the Sheila Dikshit
led her to win the elections"'. Bhagidari was also believed to attract middle-class support
towards the Congress Party, who have been traditionally Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
supporters (the major opposition party).
3.1.3 Period of the 'Rise of RWAs':
Although the 'Rise of RWAs' begins with the Bhagidari program, RWAs came to
dominate the media and public policy discourse after 2004. Two important developments
took place in this period. One, Resident Welfare Associations formed horizontal networks at
the city level to protest against increase in user-charges brought about as a result of
privatization of certain services, like electricity (refer to Chapter 4 for details). These protests
drew support from prominent citizens and celebrities and a lot of media attention. The
Government of Delhi was ultimately forced to revert to the old user-charges. The
opposition party used this as an opportunity to criticize the government of 'overlooking the
interests of the people of Delhi and selling them out to multinational and private
companies 4,'. With this development however Resident Welfare Associations became the key
51 "Congress to face elections with full confidence: Sheila", The Hindu, New Delhi, October 07, 2003
52 "Congress waits to reap Bhagidari harvest", The Hindu, New Delhi, November 14, 2003
53 Personal interview with Kiron Wadhera, President and CEO ACORD [Delhi, February 2007]
54 "BJP criticises seven years of Sheila's rule", The Hindu, New Delhi, December 17, 2005
'voice' of the citizen through local media and were often very critical of the policies of the
Dikshit government, including the Bhagidari program. For example:
"It is felt that for the first time during the Congress rule in Delhi, the common man
has come out on the streets in protest against the policies and programs of the Congress
Government in Delhi with respect to power and water situation. Not only are the RWAs
asking questions about power and water issues, but they have also started doubting the
intentions of the Government on the Bhagidari scheme itself. "There is hardly any action
taking place in the Bhagidari workshops. The officials at the lower and higher level care the
least for the programs agreed during these workshops and the last five years of Bhagidari
have been frustrating. The intention is good, but the implementation is pretty bad especially
in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi," said a senior RWA member ss' .
RWAs were the most important part of Bhagidari until the beginning of this phase, all
of which were middle class in nature. The program was criticized by politicians and officials
within the State and Central government for being elitist (see newspaper except below). By
the middle of this period, the Bhagidari program diversified to include other government
initiatives like programs on environment with school children, rural areas, industrial parks,
that reached out to a larger population base.
"Union Minister of State for Urban Development Ajay Maken on Thursday took
pot shots at the much talked about scheme by stating that it had not been able to penetrate
the deep pockets of population in the Capital and had ended up becoming elitist in nature --
something that needs to be changed...It is not practically possible in the present set-up as 69
per cent of Delhi's population is presently residing in slums and unauthorized colonies. This
large chunk of population does not have any representation in this scheme as the Resident
Welfare Associations (RWAs) of such areas have been largely left untouched by the Bhagidari
scheme56"
Further, the friction between RWAs and the Delhi Government 'outside' the
Bhagidari program translated into the Government of Delhi shying away from RWAs. The
number of Bhagidari workshops and meetings declined (as observed in the newspaper report
below), which was another source of criticism of the Delhi Government. I attended a
seminar on governance in Indian mega-cities in summer 2006 which the Chief Minister
attended. I was a little surprised that she didn't even mention Bhagidari once. Instead she
talked about how citizens want governments to deliver, but forget about their responsibility
(referring to non-payment of electricity bills by RWAs, discussed later in the report). Later a
55 "Bhagidars turn the heat on Sheila Govt.", The Hindu, New Delhi, July 31, 2005
56 "Maken lashes out at Bhagidarl', The Hindu, New Delhi, March 10, 2006
professor of Urban Economics at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (who had organized the
seminar), told me that he thought that Bhagidari had reached its peak and now she was
deliberately trying to distance herself from it given that RWAs had become so powerful. It is
true that focus of the program has shifted away from RWAs in the last one and a half years,
but Bhagidari continues to be as high profile. New sectors like education and the
environment and most recently slum settlements in the city are the new focus of the
program (see Chapter 5).
"What has been one of the biggest setbacks for Ms. Dikshit, observers feel, is the
stagnation of the much talked about Bhagidari scheme with its stakeholders coming out on
the streets against the Delhi Government. Most of the RWAs have come down heavily on
the Government on the power and water issue and now have threatened to launch an
agitation...The Government is so wary of the "bhagidars" that it has for months shied away
from holding Bheidari meetings...Apart from the "bhagidars", the MLAs too are very vocal
on the power and water issues and saying that "if elections are held today, the party will lose
power in Delhi57".
The second important development was a Supreme Court ruling that ordered closing
down or 'sealing' of all unauthorized commercial establishments like shops in the city (also
described in detail in the following chapter). The MCD, which during this period was
governed by the Congress Party, was to carry out the implementation of the order. The
business community in Delhi on the other hand has traditionally been BJP supporters, the
main opposition party. BJP, that seemed to have lost support from RWAs in Assembly
Elections in early 2004, started working with associations of traders called Markets and
Traders Associations s8 (MTAs). MTAs were another stakeholder in Bhagidari program. BJP
along with MTAs protested against the Congress Party, the party in power at both the Delhi
Government and the MCD. For example, BJP supported "Delhi bandh59" called by
Confederation of All-India Traders and about 500 MTAs60 . They also appealed to the
Supreme Court to review its ruling61. RWAs umbrella organizations, that had by now
become a major voice in city level policy making, however supported the Court judgment.
57 "Resentment clouds Sheila's 7 years in office", The Hindu, New Delhi, December 14, 2005
s8 Personal interview with Kiron Wadhera, President and CEO ACORD [Delhi, February 2007]
59 Literally meaning 'closed' in Hindi, Bandb is a form of protest used by political activists, but not the same as
strike. It means the closing down of a major marketplace of a city for the day; but there have been instances
when entire Metros come to a standstill because of bandh.
60 "Delhi traders' bandb turns violent", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 21, 2006
61 '"Temporary relief for Delhi shops", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 29, 2006
This further created friction between two of the most important 'stakeholders' in the
Bhagidari program: RWAs and MTAs. Conflict between the two groups continues as of now
(see chapter 4).
The major political implications of the Bhagidari program, most importantly the
change in the relationship between RWAs and government agencies, and the Delhi
Government and Municipal Government are also best understood in this period, although
they draw their roots to the 'administrative mechanisms of implementation' that took shape
from 2000 onwards. The following section describes these processes in detail.
3.2 Impact of the BhagidariProgram
One way of evaluating Bhagidari would be to study the impacts of the program as
against the intended objectives (listed in Chapter 2). But these objectives are rather vague;
empowerment or ownership to government programs can mean many things. Even if we
were to determine indicators that could measure these objectives in some way, it would still
be difficult to attribute the results to Bhagidari. No agency keeps any systematic records on
projects done with RWAs, or the number or type of complaints that are reported to the
'Bhagidari Cells' in various government agencies that are part of the program. The Special
Secretary to the CM described Bhagidari "not as a specific program, but a way of doing things
that enables us [government agencies] to identify the root cause of problems in
infrastructure delivery through consultation with citizens62".
This section is not intended to be an evaluation of the program, but I try to examine
the ways in which delivery of services has changed as result of the program. I also look at
how Bhagidari influenced the relationship between government agencies [the Delhi
Government and MCD], and citizen groups and government officials and political
representatives.
3.2.1 Service Delivery
Independent studies indicate that government responsiveness and service delivery
has improved as a result of Bhagidari. These studies are not based on actual measurement of
services (say improvement in water supply) but on perception of RWA members. For
62 Personal interview with Mr. Yadav, Special Secretary to Chief Minister [Chief Minister's Office, Delhi, July
2006]
example, a survey of 132 RWAs across Delhi conducted by TNS-MODE in August-
September 2003 presents that 74% of the respondents believed Bhagidari had improved the
quality of life in Delhi. 96% said that Bhagidari was a good concept and process and 30% said
that corruption has decreased after Bbagidari. 68% said that government officials have
become more responsive (GoI, 2004). As per another survey carried out in 2004 by the
Government of Delhi, 19-54% of the citizen groups perceived an improvement in delivery
of services. The main sectors of improvements, as observed by RWAs, have been
maintenance of roads, water supply, and garbage removal (see table below).
Table 3.1 RWA Perceptions of Improvement in Service Delivery
Proportion (%) of respondents who felt Main
services had Implementing
Civic Services in Delhi Improved Constant Deteriorated Agency
Water Supply 47 42 11 Delhi Jal Board
Maintenance of Roads and Parks 48 29 23 MCD
Garbage Removal 35 46 19 MCD
Maintenance of Sewers and Drains 34 46 20 MCD
Law and Order 39 48 13 Delhi Police
Water Conservation 23 69 8 Delhi Jal Board
Source: TNS-MODE Survey, August-September 2003 (Gol, 2004)
There may be two main reasons behind this change. The first could be because of
the administrative mechanisms devised for the program. After 2003, 'Bhagidari Cells' and
'Nodal officers' were constituted in various government departments. RWAs had the
recourse of contacting the 'Bhagidari Cell' in these agencies or the Chief Minister's Office
directly in case they were unsatisfied with services. Since the CM was taking personal interest
in the program, especially in the initial stages of the program (discussed earlier), this acted as
a strong incentive for government officials and political representatives to be more
responsive to RWAs. In a way, RWAs emerged as pressure groups for government agencies
to deliver. Some RWAs told me that the response time for government agencies to address
maintenance issues (like fixing water leaks, garbage collection etc) had reduced after Bhagidari
was introduced specifically for this reason. They did not always approach the Chief
Minister's Office, but merely 'threatening' to do so helped in attracting the attention of
government officials and local politicians. It is however important to note that this
mechanism did not always have positive implications. The Third Working Report on
Bhagidari (GoI, 2004) notes that "some RWAs and their main office bearers became very
aggressive and overbearing in their dealings with officials. There were several reports that
they walked into government offices without appointments, flashing the 'Bhagidari-Team
Delhi' identity card, using strong language, pressurizing officials, and threatening to 'report
them to the Chief Minister' etc. The officials hence recoiled and became even more non-
cooperative and intransigent". The following section (3.2.2) describes service delivery with
respect to responsiveness of government agencies.
The second reason why service delivery might have improved could be because
RWAs have taken up certain service delivery functions themselves as part of the Bhagidari
program. This includes the sectors of power, solid waste management, water conservation,
environmental protection, disaster management, crime prevention and even heritage
conservation 63. For example, RWAs collaborated with Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB), the
electricity utility agency before its privatization, to take over the work of switching on and
off street lights in their area, maintenance of breakdown registers, meter reading and delivery
and payment of electricity bills6 . RWAs also collect water bills for the Delhi Jal Board
(DJB)65. They assist DJB employees in finding leaks in the distribution network66. Many
RWAs took up the responsibility of planting trees (supplied by government agencies) and
maintaining community parks and other community facilities. The Government of Delhi
provided subsidies and technical expertise to RWAs to implement rainwater harvesting
projects, especially since Delhi is a water scarce region.
There are two ways of looking at this development. One, government agencies in
India still do not always have adequate financial and monitoring capacity. The program
facilitates citizen groups to assist the government by filling in the gaps in finance and
maintenance, thereby allowing neighborhoods to enjoy facilities that previously they were
not able to. RWAs however are being encouraged to involve not only in the maintenance of
services but also in making capital investments. For example, Delhi Government subsidizes
half the cost of rainwater harvesting plants constructed by RWAs. This policy hence places
63 "Asiad complex cleaner, greener", The Hindu, New Delhi, July 07, 2000
"Disaster control: CM reaches out to RWAs", The Hindu, New Delhi, May 05, 2002
"Drive to check crime", The Hindu, New Delhi, July 24, 2004
"Residents to help clean Sanjay Lake", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 28, 2004
64 "RWAS to develop 80 parks", The Hindu, New Delhi, August 17, 2000
65 "Jal Board's new schemes", The Hindu, New Delhi, August 03, 2000
"RWAs to help DJB in finding leaks", The Statesman, New Delhi, September 7, 2005
66 "RWAs to help DJB in finding leaks", The Statesman, New Delhi, September 7, 2005
"Optimum use for Barat Ghars", The Hindu, New Delhi, February 11, 2002
high-income neighborhoods in a better position to access government revenues for
developmental work thus raising the issue of cost-sharing on part of the State (Kundu D,
2006). The argument of 'augmenting local facilities with citizen help' is presented by the
Delhi Government, while the 'cost-sharing critique' is put forth by RWA umbrella
organizations and academics.
3.2.2 Relationship between RWAs and Government Agencies
During my interviews, not many RWAs acknowledged that Bhagidari led to
improvement in service delivery, but one observation that ran across all RWAs irrespective
of income and locational characteristics of RWAs was that the program had made public
officials and political representatives more 'approachable' to citizen groups. The
improvement in responsiveness seems to lead to improvement in service delivery as well.
a) Government Officials and RWAs: Public agencies in India have traditionally
been highly technocratic and most officials consider interactions with citizens 'intrusive' to
their work. This can be traced back to the history of bureaucracy in India which was
designed with the purpose of creating a distance between the 'natives' and the 'State'
(Maheshwari, 2005). This mind-set is well exemplified by the Special Secretary to the CM in
one of the interviews when he was trying to explain the reasons behind Bhagidari program:
"You know how we are; we would tell them [citizens] that we are busy in meetings so they
would leave us [government officials] alone and let us do our work. Bhagidari aims to change
this attitude67"
An instrument used to bring about this change was workshops and monthly meeting
organized under the Bhagidari program. Public officials and political representatives from all
the Zonal Offices of government agencies are required to attend these meetings. According
to RWAs, these meetings provided a platform for residents and government to meet and
helped in developing a one-to-one relationship with public officials working in a particular
ward or sector. It also provided information about the officials in specific departments
within the agencies. The meetings helped in reducing the anonymity of 'the RWA' to
government officials and 'the public agency' and its various 'fractions' to RWAs. While
describing this process the RWA Secretary in Munirka Vihar, a relatively high income
67 Personal interview with Mr. Yadav, Special Secretary to Chief Minister [Chief Minister's Office, Delhi, July
2006]
neighborhood in South Delhi, said, "They [MCD officers] give us numbers, sometimes
personal cell phone numbers; we know who to call for our water problems or for
maintaining roads, or our garden. Earlier we [RWAs and residents] wasted all our time being
redirected from one office to another to register our complaints. This was definitely a
change". The RWA President in Munirka Enclave observed that once a personal rapport is
built with the officials, work gets done in a much smoother way. He said, "We no longer see
them as some babu68 in a government office; we understand their constraints and are assured
that our problems will be resolved. And they [problems] are resolved most often".
While it is true that responsiveness of government officials seems to have improved
with the implementation of Bhagidari, public agencies however are not homogenous.
Different government agencies and different level of officials responded to the program
differently. The first major difference is between agencies administered by the Delhi
Government and by Central Government respectively. While most government agencies in
Delhi have 'Bhagidari Cells', evaluation studies on Bbagidari have pointed to the irregular
attendance of 'nodal officers' from MCD, DDA, NDMC and Delhi Police in Bhagidari
meetings and workshops (Gol, 2004). All these agencies work under the Central
Government. During my fieldwork, both the Bhagidari meetings I attended (in North and
East Delhi) did not have any representatives from the Delhi Development Authority. During
the meeting, officials and RWAs expressed their frustration at the uncertain attendance of
DDA and MCD employees. This is important because DDA and MCD works most closely
with RWAs in issues like garbage collection, construction and maintenance of parks and
roads, and other infrastructure development. The Deputy Commissioner"6 told me that this
is a trend that runs across all districts. Also these agencies are often represented by a
different official every month, which makes follow-up on old complaints difficult70 .
Response from the private electricity distribution company, also under the regulatory
framework of Delhi Administration, however was very good and they were also known to
quite effective in redressing complains.
68 The term babu in modern-day South Asia is used as a sign of respect towards men (especially in the public
sector). The word hints at corrupt or lazy work practices.69 Personal interview with Ms. Achala Singh, Deputy Commissioner North Delhi [Delhi, August 2006]
70 During the Bbagidari Meetings however I observed irrespective of government agency that there was no
effort to discuss whether complains in previous meetings were resolved.
This is not surprising because Bhagidari is a Government of Delhi program. The
carrot and stick mechanism that may work with Delhi Government agencies, with the end of
the accountability loop tied to the Chief Minister's Office, would not work in agencies that
are under the Federal Government71 . Secondly, both MCD and DDA are large and powerful
organizations that are involved in bulk of the development work in the city, long before the
Legislative Assembly of Delhi was even constituted. MCD and DDA officials were unhappy
about working under Delhi Government officials who were junior to them. For example,
'Deputy Commissioners of the MCD conveyed to the Municipal Commissioner that they
would not attend Bhagidari meetings at the District level because Deputy Commissioners of
the Delhi Government who far junior to them7 2'. Bhagidari also created tension between the
Delhi Government and the MCD. MCD, especially Municipal Councilors within MCD, saw
Bhagidari as an 'indirect means' that the Chief Minister was employing to control them. This
further led to resistance on part of MCD officials and councilors to implement the program
(see section 3.2.3 for details).
Studies on government responsiveness across agencies also indicate discontent
against the DDA and MCD. According to the 'Public Perception Survey, the performance of
all governance agencies in Delhi improved with the exception of MCD and DDA [see table
below]. It is interesting to observe that the Delhi Police and NDMC, which are also under
Government of India, seem to be doing better.
Table 3.2 Perceptions of success and failure by 240 Citizen's Groups
Department Success Failure Interface with Multiplicity
(%) (%) RWAs of Tasks
Delhi Jal Board 74 26 Medium Single
DVB/DISCOMs 73 27 Medium Single
MCD 40 60 High Multiple
DDA 43 57 High Multiple
Delhi Police 73 27 Medium Both
Dept. of Environment, GNCTD 52 48 Medium Single
NDMC 71 29 Medium Multiple
Source: Public Perception Survey 2004, (GNCTD, 2006)
71 Both DDA and MCD are autonomous in its internal administration and the organizations are ultimately
accountable to the Ministry of Urban Development and Home Affairs Government of India respectively.72 "Delhi Govt., MCD set for a clash", The Hindu, New Delhi, June 03, 2005
A closer look at Tables 2.1 and 2.2 however indicate that these statistics may not
entirely reflect the better performance or the lack of effort on part of some agencies. For
example, the most improved infrastructure according to Table 2.1 is 'maintenance of roads
and parks' which is undertaken by MCD. MCD also looks after garbage collection and
sewerage and drainage, the two sectors that did the worst. Table 2.2 reveals that most
agencies with single tasks tend to have a better perception. Secondly, although MCD and
DDA officials do not attend Bhagidari meetings often and have not been very supportive of
the program, it is important to note that these two organizations, especially the MCD, are
responsible for bulk of the development and maintenance works in the neighborhoods that
RWAs are most concerned with. These two agencies also interact with RWAs more than any
other local agency73 . Therefore it will not be fair to judge the performance of certain
government agencies based on whether or not they were responsive to Bhagidari, as current
evaluation studies tend to do.
The second important distinction in responsiveness is between different levels of
government officials. Evaluation studies on Bhagidari conclude that mid-level officials are less
inclined to be involved in the program (Gol, 2003). Lack of awareness of the program is
cited as the most important reason behind it. This may be true to an extent, but it does not
explain the responsiveness of lower-level employees. Another possible explanation could be
traced back to the degree of interaction between different kind of government officials and
RWAs. High-level officials usually head different government departments. These officials
make presentations to large groups of RWAs in public meetings and workshops but do not
interact with RWAs on a day-to-day basis. They are directly accountable to the Heads of
their respective agencies or to the Chief Minister directly. They are the most likely to
institute policy level changes and reforms in their organizations, but the direct impacts of the
changes are borne by mid and lower level staff. The lower-level staff works in the field. They
interact with residents and RWAs on a day-to-day basis. Implementation of the Bhagidari
program did not lead to many changes in the nature of their work. In some cases their work,
which often goes unnoticed, was recognized was RWAs. The mid-level officials, whose job
73 NDMC is an exception in this analysis because it has a much smaller jurisdiction compared to any of the
other agencies. The NDMC area comprises of the Capital: Federal Government and International Institutions
and State-owned housing for Central Government Ministers, Parliamentarians and Officials. NDMC is funded
by the Center and the level of infrastructure and amenities is better than other parts of the city.
entails a mix of fieldwork and administrative work, were the ones who had to go out of their
way to meet with RWAs. Bhagidari was an added burden for mid-level officials.
b) Political Representatives and RWAs: While the behavior of government
officials can be traced back to the history and purpose of bureaucracy in India, the
relationship between RWAs and municipal councilors follows a different dynamic that varies
across wards. The middle class in India is known to have low participation rates in election,
especially in local elections. In the South Delhi ward, for example the voter participation rate
in the 2002 MCD election was only 32.5%. RWAs from some of the neighborhoods from
this ward met with the Municipal Councilor for the first time during Bhagidari meetings.
RWAs from the North Delhi Ward (that has a slightly higher voter turnout rate of 43.6% for
the same year) knew however their councilor even before the program, but the
administrative mechanisms built in the Bhagidari (i.e. Bhagidari Cells and Nodal Officers)
allowed them to access local politicians through other means. For example, if RWAs were
not satisfied with the councilor, they could approach the 'Bhagidari Cell' in the MCD to
register complaints against him/ her. While such mechanisms were helpful in improving the
responsiveness of councilors to an extent, they also resulted in tension between RWA
members and local politicians (see Chapter 5 for details). But an important impact of
Bbagidari was that it brought RWAs and local political representatives (both MCD councilors
and Members of Legislative Assembly) to one forum.
3.2.3 Relationship between Delhi Government and Political
Representatives
I already discussed how representation of MCD employees was difficult to ensure in
Bhagidari meetings and workshops (in section 3.2.2). But we would imagine that participation
of political representatives in the Delhi Government and MCD would be smooth since the
Congress Party was in power at both the State and Municipal Level. Further the program
had not changed any formal political structures. That was part of the reason why Bhagidari
could be implemented while similar central government policies on decentralization could
not find political support. But Bhagidari led to a tug of war between the Delhi Government
and the Municipal Government of Delhi nonetheless. This was because local political
representatives saw Bhagidari as a means of intrusion into their political space by the Delhi
Government.
"The latest round of confrontation has been touched off by the MCD leadership's
decision to curtail the number of officials deputed for the Bhagidari scheme meetings on the
ground that it was affecting the working of the civic body...The Bhagidari scheme is close to
the heart of Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit and her close bureaucrats and any attempts to
downsize its reach is likely to draw the ire of the Government.. .Interestingly, the Congress
Councilors have from the very beginning opposed the Bhagidari scheme, describing it as an
attempt to clip the wings of the elected representatives 74"
A number of cases support this argument. For example, Bhagidari had the support of
Heads of government agencies, including the MCD, as discussed earlier (see section 3.2.2).
Municipal Councilors however claimed that the Chief Minister was trying to run the MCD
'through a remote control called the 'Commissioner'7 5 and implementing her plans in the
name of 'Bhagidar?6 '. Evaluation studies on Bhagidari again state that local politicians 'did not
want RWAs work closely with officers directly' (Gol, 2003). This may be part of the reason
why councilors demanded that 'MCD's Zonal staff be stopped from attending the district-
level 'Bhagidari Workshops'. They also complained that with most of the officer in the
workshops, zonal offices are left with no one to attend public grievances7.
Another important development towards the end of 2004 was that the Government
of Delhi proposed to fund RWAs directly through the District level Deputy Commissioners.
This again evoked strong reactions by both Municipal Councilors and Members of
Legislative Assembly, interestingly both of who belonged to the Congress Party. The
proposal was to provide RWAs with approximately US$120,000 (50 lakhs INR) per year to
identify projects at the local level and allocate funds for the same. Local political
representatives viewed this proposal as 'not only undermining the role of the legislator but
also throwing up a parallel administration by creating a new system and a new set of
administrators78 '. The proposal was ultimately withdrawn.
74 "Delhi Govt., MCD set for a clash", The Hindu, New Delhi, June 03, 2005
75 The MCD has two branches: Executive and Deliberative. The 'Executive Wing' is the technocratic part of
the organization that comprises of civil servant [Commissioner, Additional Commissioner, Heads of
Departments, Deputy Commissioners and Administrative Officers]. The 'Deliberative Wing' comprises of the
Mayor and Statutory Committees and Sub-Committees comprising of elected Councilors. In most Indian cities,
the 'Executive Wing' continues to have more administrative and decision making powers than the deliberative
wing. The 74t" Constitutional Amendment Act (discussed in Chapter 2) seeks to give more functional
responsibilities to Municipal Government [from State and Central Governments] and to the 'Deliberative
Wings' within municipalities.
76 "MCD chief faces corporators' ire", The Hindu, New Delhi, May 16, 2002
77 "Bbagidari workshops", The Hindu, New Delhi, 05/05/2005
78 "Bhagidari runs into rough weather with MLAs", The Hindu, New Delhi, January 02, 2005
"How can the Chief Minister inaugurate such a function when the MCD has not
even approved such policy?" Mr. Arya Leader of Opposition in MCD] asked. "This shows that
Ms. Dikshit has been trying to bypass the deliberative wing of the MCD. This is
undemocratic," he alleged. "This is an insult to the MCD," he observed. We as responsible
opposition cannot let this happen as this is nothing but an attempt to throttle grassroots
democracy in the Capital," he stated7".
This is interesting because the Chief Minister was careful about not to introduce any
legislation that would institutionalize RWAs when Bhagidari was implemented in 2000
specifically because she did not want the program to undermine elected representatives s -0
RWAs on the other hand have been demanding legislation that would give RWAs an
independent legal status"s . Currently RWAs are registered under the Societies Registration
Act of 1860 which allows any group of seven people to form an association. RWA umbrella
organizations argue that such legislation would institutionalize RWAs with respect to
guidelines for elections, membership criteria, functions, etc thus giving them more credibility
and decision making powers in their neighborhoods8 2 .
RWAs have nonetheless assumed a powerful position not only within their
neighborhoods but also at the level of the city in the last few years. This was an outcome of
formation of horizontal networks with other RWAs and protesting against government
agencies. They have as a result influenced pubic policy outcomes on multiple occasions. The
next chapter is an account of the process of middle class activism by RWAs in Delhi and the
factors that led to it.
79 "Government bypassing MCD, says BJP", The Hindu, New Delhi, October 30, 2004
so '~This is a voluntary movement and we cannot create any parallel system by introducing legislation.
We have a bureaucracy and an elected government which are a part of this system and they will regulate
execution of the plan"
Source: "Bhagidari a voluntary movement, says CM", The Hindu, New Delhi, June 17, 2000
81 "Delhi RWAs ask for legal status", CivilSociety, New Delhi, July-August 2005
82 "The best future for RWAs is as urban panchayats", CivilSociet, New Delhi, September/ October 2005
Chapter 4
Middle Class Activism
and Public Policy
In the last two chapters I had described how different population groups
typically access the State and how the relationship between neighborhood
associations and government agencies had been influenced by the Bhagidari program.
This chapter reviews the dominant literature that explains the rise of neighborhood
associations in India in recent years and its impact on urban public space. I describe
the larger impacts of neighborhood associations on public policy through formation
of horizontal networks with other associations, exploring the key role of media and
judiciary in the process. I explore the factors behind this collective action and the
extent to which Bhagidari was instrumental in this change. I discover that contrary to
common perception, RWAs umbrella organizations are fragmented and represent a
change in the traditional role of civil society in India that has been disjointed from
formal electoral politics.
"For hundreds and thousands of consumers there is only one lesson
from weeks of complaining and coming out on the streets. It is that middle class
anger pays. The louder you scream the better".
Civil Society, New Delhi, September-October, 2005
4.1 Rise of Middle Class Activism:
The Dominant Explanation and Evidence from Delhi
The recent body of literature on the rise of middle class in India focuses on the
impact neighborhood associations on the use of urban public space. Political scientists and
sociologists explain the behavior of neighborhood associations in the context of 'globalizing
cities'. Fernandes (2006) argues that the 'new' middle class in India is a product of economic
reforms of early nineties which led to exponential growths in income of the managerial class
employed in multinational firms. The formation of neighborhood associations by this class,
she argues, is a means of 'reclaiming public space and consolidating a style of living that can
adequately embody its self-image as the primary agents of the globalizing city and nation'.
This is reflected by slum evictions from public spaces that are often carried out through
these associations on grounds of 'public interest and the environment'. Soloman (2005) also
explains these associations as a sociological phenomenon as the middle class begins to mimic
the lifestyle of the 'global city' and displace subaltern groups in this process. These agents of
globalization here are represented by the managerial and technocratic elite that 'form their
own community - spatially bound, interpersonally networked subculture built around the
business centre, segregated residential areas, arts and culture complexes, and easy access to
airports' (Chatterjee, 2004). He further explains the mobilization by organizations of middle-
class as a means to 'assert their right to unhindered access to public spaces and
thoroughfares and to a clean and healthy urban environment'. He ties this development to
economic liberalization and argues that it is a result circulation of images of global cities
through cinema, television, and the internet as well as through the India middle classes' far
greater access to international travel. Fernandes (2006) emphasizes that these associations
seek to reproduce a clear socio-spatial separation from groups such as street vendors and
squatters.
In Delhi too the actions of many Resident Welfare Associations support this
explanation. For example, vendors have been restricted to enter the colony through the
efforts of Sundar Nagar RWA. In another instance, an RWA sent a petition against vendors,
encroachments and poor sanitary conditions to the Delhi High Court. Following the Public
Interest Litigation (PIL), the court directed the MCD to remove all slum clusters from the
colony. Kundu, D. (2006) argues that the appointment of court commissioners by the Delhi
High Court to monitor illegal construction in not new in Delhi. But appointment of RWA
members in the committee instead of lawyers is definitely a departure from the previous
organizational structure. In my own interviews with members of RWAs, they often equated
slum settlements within and around their neighborhood to criminals (because they occupy
land illegally) and stated that removal of 'encroachments' was one of the objectives of the
association. Almost every middle class neighborhood that I visited in Delhi was gated (often
with the name of the RWA on a banner on top of the main gates)83 pointing towards the
exclusionary nature of middle class neighborhoods.
While it is true that some neighborhood associations have begun to assume a
hegemonic role in determining the use of public spaces, this observation is perhaps true only
83 1 have lived in New Delhi from 1998 to 2005. During the last nine years I have observed that the number of
gated neighborhoods has increased. These gates are almost always privately constructed by Resident Welfare
Associations.
for the elite neighborhoods in the city. Most neighborhood associations continue to be
chiefly involved in management of service delivery in their respective areas. Secondly,
although the frequency of slum eviction/ resettlement has increased in the last few years (the
period also associated with the rise of neighborhood associations) there have been other
factors that have contributed to it. An exponential increase in land values as a result of rapid
economic growth is an important reason. In the case of Delhi, many recent slum relocations
may be attributed to the 2010 Commonwealth Games that Delhi is hosting. As reflected by
the Asian Games 1983, before every such event the city, especially the venues near the
games, are spruced up and infrastructure for visitors created, often resulting in large slum
relocations. With the attention of the world media on Delhi, 'beautifying' the city becomes
high on the agenda of local agencies. Further, there is a strong focus on improving large
scale infrastructure in cities to attract global investment; which too results in displacement of
informal settlements. Government agencies and political leaders in Delhi term this as
creation of a 'world-class city'. For example, of the US$1350 million (5,500 crore INR)
National Urban Renewal Mission, a Government of India program on urban development,
about US$380 million (1,560 crore INR) grant is allocated to finance key infrastructure
projects in mega cities". This investment has been channeled in the power, water and
transport sectors in particular in Delhi8 5. This sentiment is well exemplified in a newspaper
interview with the Chief Minister: "The Games will result in an urban transformation of
Delhi, and shall give us the opportunity to upgrade Delhi's infrastructure and make it a
world-class citys6". So, while RWAs might not be the main factor responsible for the change
in the use of urban public space, these developments are nonetheless consistent with the
globalizing city theory.
While defining the behavior of neighborhood associations with respect to other
subaltern groups is a useful way of understanding the evolution of the middle class, the
impact of these associations is not just restricted to the use of public spaces. Umbrella
organizations of RWAs in Delhi have also had a very significant impact on public policy
decisions made by the State and Municipal governments. Within the context of this research,
84 "Delhi eyes Center's urban renewal pie", The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 1, 2005
85 "Govt. committed towards making Delhi a world class city: Lieutenant Governor", The Hindu, New Delhi,
March 16, 2005
86 "It is an honour for Delhi: Interview with Chief Minister Sheila Dixit", Frontline, New Delhi, Volume 23,
Issue 06, Mar. 25-Apr. 07, 2006
I describe mobilization by Resident Welfare Associations as a form of Middle Class
Activism. This mobilization is chiefly a result of formation of horizontal networks with other
RWAs in the city. This chapter focuses on the process through which such networks were
formed and the factors that contributed to this development.
4.2 Origins of RWA Mobilization: The Two Groups
Collective action by RWAs is not new to Delhi. In chapter two (Section 2.3) while
illustrating the mechanisms through which RWAs access the State, I discussed how RWAs in
a large high-income neighborhood of Delhi bargained with government agencies collectively
to prevent unauthorized constructions in their neighborhoods from being demolished by the
DDA. This included 100 RWAs from a single part of the city dealing with a single issue. The
Government of Delhi had encouraged formation of Federations of RWAs at the district
level in Delhi that could discuss issues of larger scale that individual RWA can not. These
associations have been however represented only a part of the city and have died out after
the issue was resolved. There are two large umbrella organizations of RWAs that have a city-
wide presence and are covered most often by the media. Both were formed within the last
five years. They are the 'Delhi Residents Welfare Association Joint Front' and 'People's
Action'.
4.2.1 Delhi RWA Joint Front
The 'Delhi Residents Welfare Association Joint Front' was formed in 2003 in
response to change in cable television technology in the city which was expected to lead to
increase in user-charges. Conditional Access Systems7 (CAS) was introduced in India for the
first time in South Delhi in October 2003. In addition to the increase in monthly
subscription charges, customers also needed to make additional investments on 'set-top
boxes' or tuners. Cable television in India is privately operated but the entire system is under
the regulatory framework of Government of India through the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting (I&B). There was a lot of public resentment against this government
regulation. The Chief Minister was 'flooded with protests from various RWAs' regarding this
87 'Conditional Access System' is a system by which electronic transmission of digital media, especially satellite
television signals through cable, is limited to subscribed clients. The signal is encrypted and is unavailable for
unauthorized reception. A 'set-top box' containing a conditional access module is required in the customer
premises to receive and decrypt the signal.
issue in a Bhagidari workshop. RWAs blamed the Union Information and Broadcasting
Ministry for being 'hand in glove with cable operators instead of catering to the interests of
consumers'88. While discontent against the regulation was high among the residents, a few of
the RWAs that attended Bhagidari workshops in the South Delhi district realized that it
would be easier to bargain with government agencies as one group, rather than disjointed
voices. These RWAs mobilized like-minded people from other RWAs and the Joint Front
was formed with an initial membership of 20 associations, all from South Delhis". Joint
Front claims to have been able to standardize the implementation of the new cable television
technology by bringing 30,000 cable operators under the regulatory system. This
standardization was achieved through meetings with the Chief Minister, Union Minister for
Information and Broadcasting, Chief Secretary of Delhi, and forming public opinion with
the help of media. The Government of Delhi views this as a means of involving citizens in
'complex policy proposal which would have a direct and significant impact on citizens' (GoI,
2004). In fact, they were supportive of this development as is reflected by the following
except from the official evaluation reports on Bhagidari (Gol, 2004):
"Delhi Government sought the views of RWAs and RWA Federations. In addition
to proving their feedback, RWAs and RWA federations quickly organized themselves into a
strong residents movement against powerful cable channel operators. The citizens and RWA
movement was so strong that the proposal had to be first postponed to December 2003 and
subsequently withdrawn by the I&B Ministry (Gol)."
The Joint Front has continued to attract more RWAs since the CAS issue and the
current membership exceeds 300. The organization comprises of a number of sub-groups
that work on sector specific issues. For example, the architect/ planners in the group work
on planning and Master Plan issues, the 'Women's Task Force' works on women specific
issues and in ensuring that there are at least three women represented in each of member
RWA. This body has been most active in protesting against increase in electricity charges and
in implementation of the Delhi Master Plan (see Section 3.3).
88 "RWAs up in arms over CAS", The Hindu, New Delhi, 21/12/2003
89 Personal interview with Pankaj Aggarwal, Secretary Joint Front Delhi, February 2007]
4.2.2 People's Action
The second association of RWAs, called 'People's Action', was also formed in 2003
but under somewhat different circumstances. The President of the organization heads a
Public Relations company that in 2002 was consulting for the newly introduced radio-taxis in
the city. His firm prepared a log-sheet for the taxi company that calculated fares based on
distance. He suggested that the same concept be used for standardization of auto-rickshaw
fares and presented the matrix to the Transport Commissioner of Delhi Government. The
government adopted this system and it was widely advertised in the newspapers. The
Transport Minister for Delhi for example issued a public warning to auto-rickshaw drivers
for exploiting passengers by running faulty meters and even announced that the Department
of Transportation would form 80 squads to discipline the drivers 90 . But this order was soon
followed by a hike in auto-rickshaw fares, ahead of the Assembly Elections of 2004. The
President of People's Action argued that the two developments are connected. He explained
the mechanics behind this policy as: "the government gets tough on auto drivers with the
help of the police (directly) and through public notices in newspapers - the auto drivers in
turn agitate - the government then makes small concessions by increasing auto fares -
drivers are content again - more than 50000 driver and their families vote for the party in
power in return and also help out during election campaigning (as carriers and workers)".
People's Action was formed to protest against such practices9 .
The Government of Delhi however presents a very different perspective on this
issue. The increase in auto fares is cited as an achievement of Bhagidari as citizen groups were
involved in an important public decision and the outcome of which was 'balanced' as a result
of consultation with different stakeholders (GoI, 2004):
"...the auto and taxi unions realized that the citizen and their RWAs exerted a
powerful voice on the side of a "balanced" increase, while earlier with auto unions could
hold the city to ransom. The rate revision finally worked out and agreed, reflected the new
balance of moderation between the key stakeholders: the citizens as "customers" (through
their RWAs), the auto and taxi unions, and the Delhi Government's Transport Ministry"
90 "Errant auto drivers will face the music: Minister", The Hindu, New Delhi, Sunday, Jan 04, 2004
91 Personal interview with Sanjay Kaul, President People's Action [Delhi, December 2006]
People's Action is very critical of the role of RWAs in Bhagidari and the Delhi
Government. The head of the organization argues that Bhagidari and RWAs have become a
means of off-loading State responsibility on citizens and shifting blame on citizen groups for
bad public policy decisions. It is important to note that the initial membership of People's
Action did not include RWAs. People's Action comprised of only the staff of the Public
Relations firm and later grew to include RWAs in Gurgaon (a high income suburb of Delhi)
where its President lives. The RWA membership in Delhi in the beginning grew through
personal contacts of People Action members and grew exponentially during protests against
hike in electricity tariffs in 2005. During this period a sub-group within the organization,
called United Residents Joint Action (URJA), was formed that was comprised exclusively of
RWAs. The other sub-groups include 'United Students', a youth group and New Delhi
People's Alliance (NDPA), created as a larger pressure group comprising of NGOs, RWAs
and Market and Trade bodies and unions.
4.3 Middle Class Activism: Impact and Interpretation
The middle class in India is typically known to access the State through the channels
of judiciary and bureaucracy. The middle class is active in associations but mobilization by
these associations is rare. By Middle Class Activism, I refer to large scale mobilization by
RWAs that was geared towards changing public policy outcomes. This is surprising because
mobilization of this kind in India is commonly associated with the poor. The two RWA
umbrella organizations, Joint Front and People's Action were at the forefront of this
activism. I refer to three cases of activism by RWAs. In the first case RWAs protested
against the increase in electricity user-charges after the privatization of the Delhi Electricity
Board (DVB). The second involves also protests against privatization of the water utility
agency (DJB). This was mostly led by NGOs and social activists, but RWAs also joined the
protests. The third case involves protest against unauthorized commercial properties and
zoning regulations in the city.
4.3.1 Hike in Electricity Rates
The Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB), the state-owned utility agency in charge of
supplying electricity to the city, was privatized in June 2002. This agency was undergoing
losses and it was expected that privatization would lead to better management and hence
better service delivery. In fact privatization of DVB was publicized and one of the major
achievements of the Dikshit government ahead of the 2004 elections and was supported by
the public as reflected by opinion surveys 92 .
DVB was broken into a holding company, a generation company, a transmission
company and three privately owned distribution companies (DISCOMs) - New Delhi Power
Ltd. (NDPL), BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. and BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. owned by the Tata
and Reliance companies, were formed. As part of their up-gradation strategy, new electricity
meters were installed. While the DISCOMs claimed that the new meters reduced power
leakage and loss, residents alleged that the meters were faulty and led to higher electricity
bills. Errors in billing were experienced from early 2004 onwards"93 but the new private
enterprises announced a tariff increase of 10% in mid-2005. This led to further discontent.
Residents approached RWAs in their neighborhood to resolve this with government
agencies. People's Action and Joint Front began to mobilize RWAs to protest against this
regulation.
What was unique about these protests was that it was not led by any political party.
While the opposition parties did take a stand against the tariff hike (as did some people in
the government), the protest was led by
associations of RWAs. The protests were
extremely well managed; public meetings,
press conferences and rallies were the main
forms of protest. Many prominent citizens
and celebrities (though not RWA members
themselves) supported the rallies and
became its spokesperson9 4 . This generated a
lot of media attention which translated into
further oressure on the government. Some
Figure 4.1 RWA demonstrations against hike
in electricity rates RWAs refused to pay the 10% hike as a
(The Hindu, New Delhi, Dec18, 2005)
92 For example, 82% of RWAs were in favor of privatization of DJB in the TNS-MODE in August-September
2003
93 "Reader's Mail: Weird billing", The Hindu, New Delhi, February 09, 2004 and "Billing errors continue to
haunt residents", The Hindu, New Delhi, February 26, 2004
94 Supporters included theatre/cinema personality Roshan Seth, author and management guru Shiv Khera and
journalist and media/entertainment company owner, Pritish Nandy
mark of protest. Some negotiated with power companies and the Delhi Government to
reverse their regulation. Within eight weeks, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission restrained private power distribution companies from charging consumers on
the basis of the newly installed electronic meters9s
One of the most important reasons behind the success of the protest has been the
mechanisms that RWA umbrella organizations used to draw the attention of the people and
the government. The use of media, both electronic and print, is central to the protests
assuming a citywide presence. It is important to note that heads of both RWA organizations
are associated with the media: People's Action President heads a Public Relations agency and
has had networks within the media, and Joint Front President was the Chief of Press Trust
of India (PTI), a major news agency. The use of famous personalities was an important
means to attract media attention. All major newspapers circulated in Delhi carried the power
hike story regularly96 . Many RWAs boycotted meetings with the Chief Minister until she
decided to withdraw the hike and during this period the main source of communication
between RWAs and the government was through newspapers and television. Live television
broadcasts of protests by residents in a neighborhood called Greater Kailash in tevlevision
news channels gave the protests a perception of mass gravity (Sirari, 2006).
Mass media in India has itself gone through significant changes in the last fifteen
years after liberalization. The first is the exponential increase in the number of television
channels"7 resulting in competition between channels. There is hence a constant struggle
over Television Ratings Points and effort to fill in air-time. This contrasts with the one State-
owned channel in India prior to 1992. Competition between channels has further
contributed to the localization in media. Local supplements [newspapers and television news
channels] cater specifically to city level issues and give citizens' a space to articulate their day-
to-day problems. All newspapers have exclusive local sections; the coverage of the power
hike story in newspapers reflects its popularity. It may be argued that media can also be used
95 Personal interview with Mr. Pramod Chawla, Chair United Residents Joint Action (URJA) [Delhi, July 2006]
96 For example, from July 15th to September 5t , 'The Hindu' newspaper ran 35 stories on the power issue. 'The
Times of India' had 15 and 'Punjab Kesri' (a Hindi newspaper read the masses) had 33 stories respectively
(Sirari, 2006)
97 Starting with just 41 television sets in 1962, television covers more than 70 million homes, more than 400
million individuals, in India currently. Until 1992, there was only one government owned channel
[Doordarshan] in the country. The government liberalized its markets and cable television was launched in
1992. Currently there are more than 250 national and regional channels. Of this, there are more than 40 news
channels, many of which focus exclusively on local issues.
as a medium to control public opinion, especially by politicians. The Indian news media is
however credited with being one of the most plural and independent in the third world
(Besley, and Burgess, 2001)98. Although political parties largely do not control the media in
India, it has been argued that the media is one of the institutions that the middle class
dominates (Femandes, 2006).
4.3.2 Privatization of Water
Delhi has severe water crisis especially during the summer months, and the situation
exacerbates with poor management of water resources by residents and government
agencies"99. In order to carry out water sector reforms in the city, the water and sanitation
utility agency, Delhi Jal Board (DJB), applied to the World Bank for a US$150 million loan
in 1998. As part of the reform, the World Bank recommended privatization of DJB. The
Delhi Government planned to hand over the management of each of the 21 zones of the
Delhi Jal Board to multinational companies. The bank gave a loan of US$2.5 million to
appoint a consultant to work on the privatization project. Privatization of water has been
culturally and politically difficult to carry out on the rationale that water is a basic human
right, but the mechanism through which bids for the consultancy was carried out in this case
drew more criticism'00. This protest was led mainly by social activists and NGOs, including
Arvind Kejriwal of the NGO 'Parivartan' and Vandana Shiva from the 'Research
Foundation of Science, Technology and Ecology1'"'. They argued that privatization of water
would have harmful consequences for the urban poor who will not be able to afford the
increase in water charges 102.
It is surprising to note that RWAs from South Delhi, which is a relatively well off
part of the city, joined the protests. This was because they were unsatisfied with the outcome
98 Sen in "Development and Freedom" even argues that the reason why there has never been any famine is
independent India is because of the role of the media. The press has been ascribed as a major source in
monitoring the actions of politicians and in ensuring their responsiveness to droughts and floods (Besley, and
Burgess, 2001)
99 For example, 25% of Delhi's population does not receive DJB water. 40% of the city does not have sewer
lines (CCS, 2003)
100 According to social activist Arvind Khejriwal, PricewaterHouseCooper had lost thrice in the normal bidding
process for management for DJB zones, but won the final contract after intervention of World Bank
employees overruling strong protests by DJB and elected representatives.
Source: "Probe 'irregularities by World Bank officials: Parivartan", The Hindu, New Delhi, 21 August,
2005
101 Both Kejriwal and Shiva are internationally acknowledged social activists.
102 "24/7 water: Citizen's for a protest outside the WB office", Times ofIndia, New Delhi, 21 August 2005
from privatization of the electricity board. They claimed that while the user-charges had
increased, the quality of services had remained poor and feared similar consequences with
water privatization'"'. RWAs threatened to stop paying water bills unless the Delhi
Government withdrew from the World Bank project'04 (similar to the power hike protests).
The involvement of RWAs in this protest was limited since this development coincided with
the power hike protests. But it is interesting to note that the Chief Minister referred to
RWAs, rather than the opposition party and social activists, when she withdrew from the
project (see quote below). This incident too reflects the rise in power of Resident Welfare
Associations. Media was used as an important instrument in this protest as well.
"Sheila Dikshit, today completely ruled out "privatization" of the water distribution
system in the Capital and asserted that water tariff would be raised "only" if it was approved
by and acceptable to the consumers...Seeking to allay fears of the RWA's representative with
regard to privatization, she said: "We do not intend to privatize the water sector. This is a
basic necessity of every person. It cannot be handed over to the private sector'05."
4.3.3 Master Plan and Sealing
One of the most controversial issues that RWA umbrella organizations have been
involved with regards a Supreme Court ruling that ordered the sealing or closing down of
unauthorized commercial establishments in the city. The order is based on the zoning
regulations laid out by the Master Plan for Delhi 6o'. The plan outlines amongst other
guidelines 'non-conforming' land uses, primarily for industrial and commercial use in
residential areas. It is interesting to observe that although the Master Plan outlines normative
guidelines for development, these guidelines are often enforced through the judiciary (the
Delhi High Court or the Supreme Court) often after a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is
filed. For example, in 2000, a number of polluting industrial units were shut and relocated to
103 "Privatisation a bonanza for water companies" Wednesday, The Hindu, New Delhi, July 13, 2005
104 "Agitation by RWAs against water tariffs gains momentum", The Hindu, New Delhi, 6 October 2005 and
"RWAs to wage battle on water front", The Hindu, New Delhi, October 3, 2005
105 "No privatisation of water, says CM", The Hindu, New Delhi, August 25, 2005
106 The Master Plan is a statutory planning document that outlines the broad policies for the long-term (usually
10-20 years) development for the city. The plan is prepared and enforced by the Delhi Development Authority
and a host of local bodies are responsible for its implementation. The first plan for the city was prepared in
1962 with consultation with the Ford Foundation. The next plan could not be renewed till 1986 due to the
Asian Games that Delhi hosted in 1983. This plan came into effect in 1991 for the 2001 perspective year. The
Master Plan for 2021 was enacted in February 2007.
the outskirts in the city after a Supreme Court ruling to enforce the industrial zoning laws in
the Plan.
In February 2006 the Supreme Court intervened again after a PIL and ordered the
sealing of unauthorized commercial uses in residential areas. Many of these shops were
decades old and located in the heart of the city. It was estimated that more than 500,000
people were employed in such shops"" . MCD started action in March 2006 and by May had
sealed 13,000 illegal shops amid agitated traders setting fire to MCD vehicles, pelting stones
on officials, and police lathi-charge (baton charge). Associations of traders, called Markets and
Traders' Associations (MTAs) along with BJP (the main opposition party that has
traditionally attracted support from the business community) protested against the Congress
Party - the party in power at both the Delhi Government and the MCD. The BJP supported
the "Delhi bandh" (strike) called by Confederation of All-India Traders and about 500
MTAs 8"'. They also appealed to the Supreme Court to review its ruling'"' and demanded
Central Government intervention. Union Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD)
intervened and passed an ordinance in May that put a moratorium on sealing.
This led the 'Joint Front' to file another PIL in the Supreme Court demanding
'resealing of illegal shops' on the grounds that the Central Government intervention was
politically motivated to
appease traders ahead of
the 2007 MCD elections.
The Supreme Court
nullified the Central
Government order and
the MCD began closing
down illegal shops on the
grounds. This led to
Figure 4.2 Violent protests by traders against sealing in the groun
Seelampur part of the City further protest by traders.
(Frontline, Volume 23, Issue 20, Oct. 07-20, 2006)
Violent protests in
Seelampur area of the city for example claimed four lives (see Figure 4.2) after which the
1'1 "Chaos at MCD office over sealing drive", The Hindu, New Delhi, May 03, 2006
108 "Delhi traders' bandh turns violent", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 21, 2006
1'9 "Temporary relief for Delhi shops", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 29, 2006
MCD stopped again. The Supreme Court announced that final policy on unauthorized
commercial uses was to be decided by the new Master Plan for Delhi which was under
preparation at the time. In February 2007 the New Master plan was approved by the MoUD;
the plan regularized 1500 unauthorized colonies and allowed for mixed-land use (commercial
use in residential areas) on 2138 roads in the city. Since then, a number of RWA
organizations, including the Joint Front, have challenged the Master Plan on grounds that it
is politically motivated to appease traders ahead of municipal elections.
The role of the law and judiciary in the 'Master Plan and Sealing' case exemplifies
two important arguments about the middle class and RWAs in Delhi. One, although RWAs
are prominent in most middle class parts of the city, including ones the inhabited by the
business community, RWA Activism by is primarily led by professionals. These professionals
often belong to the more wealthy parts of the city"11 . RWAs from the low-middle income
parts of Delhi criticized the Joint Front for being elitist and unaware of the 'ground realities
and the unemployment prevailing in the Capital'"". Secondly, this case is also an example of
'judiciary' as one of the most important channels that which the middle class uses to control
the State. This is not only because of their knowledge of the law and access to resources, but
also because law is at times the only course for the middle class because it is outnumbered by
the more politically active community of traders and the urban poor. This may be because
the occupations of traders and the poor are not always based on the same structures of
legality as the professional class. While political leaders regularized illegal shops on the
grounds of securing livelihoods of thousands of people, RWAs used the rationale of
'planning, public interest and citizen's rights' to approach the courts. For example, about
90% of the Public Interest Litigations filed by RWAs since 2000 (till May 2007) are regarding
encroachments on public land and unauthorized construction1 12. The two statements made
by 'Joint Front' and 'People's Action' support this argument:
110 For example, while RWAs from high income areas like Defence Colony, Kalkaji, Greater Kailash and Lajpat
Nagar strongly opposed commercialization of residential areas, those in middle-low income neighborhoods like
Rohini, Naraina and some trans-Yamuna areas wanted shops not to be sealed as they were meeting needs of
local residents.
Source: "Chaos at MCD office over sealing drive", The Hindu, New Delhi, May 03, 2006
111 "New mixed land use policy evokes mixed response", The Hindu, New Delhi, March 28, 2006
112 Office of the Registrar General, Delhi High Court
"Joint Front President: When nobody else listened to us the courts listened. Today
at last the MCD, Police and government are under pressure to implement their own law,
which so far they have cynically disregarded and lined their pockets 1 3:
"People's Action President: Our hope was that irrespective of the incidents and the
pressure, the Court would seek a fresh way to resolve the endemic problems of Delhi by
putting the fate of the city in the hands of a group of qualified planners rather than tired
bureaucrats who are influenced by the political dispensation of the day'1 4"
4.4 Factors behind RWA Activism
Three important factors contributed to mobilization by Resident Welfare
Associations. First, all RWAs that led the protests are tied by a single identity. All RWAs are
middle class in nature, but the RWAs that led the protest are also part of the professional
class. Second, we observe that almost all cases of protest have been triggered by some form
of privatization of service delivery that resulted in, or was expected to result in, increase in
user-charges. Hence RWAs were also united by a single issue. Third, Bhagidari has been
instrumental in bringing RWAs under one umbrella, not only as partners in the program but
also as an outcome of the publicity that the program received in the local media.
4.4.1 Class Identity
An interesting feature of RWA mobilization has been that it was led by professionals
even though RWAs in the city are prevalent in all kinds of middle class neighborhoods. As
observed in the Master Plan and Sealing case, the professional class is tied by a structure of
legality that the trading class does not always embody. Secondly, the issues that RWAs raise
are not only defined by its own middle class identity, but also against other social groups.
This is exemplified by protests that People's Action and URJA led against reservation for
backwards classes in institutes of higher learning (as affirmative action)"'. As observed in the
power hike case too, the rationale for protest was not just the increase in user-charges. The
power distribution companies were forced to increase rates because of power thefts, often
by residents of informal settlements. The protest was also based on the argument that the
middle class would not pay for the urban poor who form the 'vote-bank' of political
113 "Delhi residents put politicians on the mat", Civil Society, July-August, 2006
114 RWAs feel let down by the court directions, 23/10/2006
115 The Youth Group of People Action started the rally against reservation in educational institutions in April
2006. This was followed by similar protests by medical fraternity in elite Medical Schools.
leaders"'. Another important reason for collective action was learning from the successful
experience of other forms of middle class activism (outside of RWAs) and a belief that
mobilization by the RWAs would also lead to change. This followed activism by the middle
class and media to deliver justice in the Jessica Lal case"117, in which People's Action was also
involved in.
4.4.2 Single Goal
A feature that runs across most examples of RWA activism is that they were
triggered by some form of privatization of service delivery. The first issue on which RWAs
from all over the city came together and which established them as one of the key pressure
groups in decision making was regarding the hike in electricity rates. This protest followed
the privatization of the State owned electricity agency, Delhi Vidyut Board. RWAs also
protested against the World Bank recommendation on privatization of the Water Board,
which they believed would lead to increase in water rates. The 'Joint Front' was formed after
Conditional Access System in cable television was introduced which led to increase in
subscription charges.
There may be two ways of looking at this development. One, RWAs are protesting
against transfer of costs of service delivery from the State to the middle class as reflected by
the increase in user-charges in reaction to power thefts by informal settlements. But
although the 10% hike triggered the protests, the hike was also a result of installation of new
electricity meters which the private company claimed would improve power delivery. It has
often been argued the recipients for subsidies in urban services in South Asia are mostly the
middle class. In that case, RWA activism is also a reaction against changes in modes of
service delivery from a subsidy-based model whose beneficiaries were often the middle class.
"
6 For example: "RWAs lamented the insensitivity of the State Government towards consumers who pay their
bills honestly and alleged that political parties and politicians in order to protect their vote banks were covering
up power theft".
Source: "Power privatization review urged", The Hindu, New Delhi, December 18, 2005
17 Jessia Lal was murdered by a family member of a senior politician. Since all the witnesses in the case turned
hostile, the guilty were acquitted by the court. This was followed by massive public outrage led by the middle
class and widely supported by the media. This protest included rallies, candle light vigils, mobile text messaging
campaigns, etc. Because of this pressure, the case was finally reopened and the Court convicted the guilty.
4.4.3 Bhagidari
"With the "bhagidars 8s" of the Bhagidari scheme becoming more and more
demanding, the citizen-government partnership in governance is slowly turning into a
government-bashing platform where the new buzzword is "empowerment of the common
man". Not only are the residents' welfare associations increasingly asserting themselves and
seeking a more decisive role for themselves in the day-to-day affairs, they are also
scrutinizing the actions of the Government, past and present'19".
"Dikshit on her part observed rather significantly that empowering the RWAs had
become a "double-edged sword". Clearly what she had originally hoped would be contended
middle class residents playing a benign role in governance had grown into a shrill and
demanding constituency' 20".
Media reports like the one above seem to suggest that Bhagidari as the most
important reason behind activism by RWAs. This activism is, however, part of larger
sociological phenomenon as reflected by protests by middle class groups on a range of issues
(like the Jessica Lal case) and by the fact that neighborhood associations are on the rise in
most large Indian cities. But Bhagidari has been a very important instrument in bringing
RWAs from all over the city together in two ways. One, RWAs before the beginning of
Bhagidari were chiefly concerned with issues specific to their respective neighborhoods. The
program brought RWAs under one roof and facilitated communication between them. For
example, the reason why 'Joint Front' was formed because issues related to cable
television/CAS regulation were discussed in a Bhagidari workshop in South Delhi. Like-
minded RWAs who attended the event decided to bargain with the Central Government on
the regulation collectively and hence an umbrella organization of RWAs was formed. The
Delhi Government in fact had encouraged this development as a means of 'empowering
citizens' (GoI, 2004). Secondly, an important factor behind the implementation of Bhagidari
was that it was a means of publicizing the programs led by Delhi Government. Publicity of
RWAs, who were the most important partners in the program, was a spillover effect of
Bhagidari. In this process, the media came to regard RWAs as the main representatives of
the citizens of Delhi. As discussed earlier, the role of media was key in the protests led by
Resident Welfare Associations.
118 'Bhagidars' means partners in Hindi. 'Bhagidars of the Bhagidari' refers to partners in partnership
(Bhagidari program) having turned against the government
119 "Bhagidars of Bhagidari' up in arms against Sheila Government", The Hindu, New Delhi, July 17, 2006
'12 "Delhi RWAs ask for legal status", CivilSociety, July-August 2005, New Delhi,
4.5 Fragmented RWAs: Is the 'apolitical' role of middle class changing?
I had earlier described the important role of the media and the judiciary played in
protests by RWAs. This however is not new; it has often been argued that the middle class in
India controls and dominates these two institutions as a means to influence the State
(Mazzarella, 2006). But the fact that middle class residents were rallying in the streets of
Delhi is radical. RWAs in the last few years have come to represent a body unified by their
opinion on public policy (most often against the government) and as representatives of the
'common man'. A detail that most people miss however is how fragmented these RWAs are.
This is best exemplified in the power hike protests discussed earlier.
Both 'Joint Front' and 'People's Action' mobilized RWAs for these protests. Both
opposed the hike in electricity charges and used similar techniques, like attracting celebrities,
to gather media attention. Heads of both the organizations had strong affiliations with the
media due to their occupations, which they leveraged for the protests. But People's Action
appealed to RWAs to not pay the 10% hike. They protested under the banner of 'Campaign
Against Power Tariff Hike' (CAPTH) and made analogies with the ideas of "civil
disobedience/satyagraha" and "non-cooperation" used during the non-violent freedom
struggle against the British'2'. This part of the campaign was launched on Gandhi's birthday
(Gandhi Jayanti, a national holiday in India); Gandhi had led the civil-disobedience
movement during British India. Forced installation of meters was called 'Meter Terrorism'.
Private electricity distribution companies argued that the hike was a result of electricity
thefts, often by unauthorized settlements that do not have formal power connections.
People's Action/ URJA were protesting against "illegal method of charging honest
consumers for the dishonesty of others by the private power companies in league with the
Delhi Government'"". They argued that "if the private DISCOMs have not been able to
implement the promise of reduction of transmission and distribution loses then they (and
not the customers) should be penalized'23". The Joint Front refused to join this campaign,
although they also protested against the power hike. Joint Front President argued that drastic
steps like non-payment of bills should be reserved for extraordinary circumstances. People's
Action boycotted all meetings with the Chief Minister until the power hike was withdrawn.
121 "NGO launches power protest-II", The Hindu, New Delhi, October 03, 2005 and "Consumers start
movement", The Hindu, New Delhi, May 07, 2006
122 "Delhi 'Bhagidari' partners on the warpath", The Hindu, New Delhi, July 30, 2005
123 "Power consumers threaten movement", The Hindu, New Delhi, March 20, 2006
Joint Front instead attended these Bhagidari meetings called by the Chief Minster and
engaged in negotiations with government officials and politicians. They insisted that RWAs
be a part of consultation before major policy decisions are made. This included the electricity
meter review and testing initiative announced by the Delhi Electricity Regulatory
Commission (DERC)'24. The Joint Front even complimented the government for "taking
concrete measures (like holding meetings with RWAs and DISCOMs)12 5"
What surprised me was how these two groups didn't work together even though the
issues they raised were very similar; in fact the two groups hated each other! Joint Front
alleges Sanjay Kaul, head of People's Action to use RWAs in Delhi to further his 'political
agenda' while he is not even a resident of Delhi1 26.Kaul blames instead Joint Front as being
"CM's henchmen and bhagidari loyalists [since the Joint Front President had been an
important player in the Bhagidari program]. He is also very critical of the Bhagidari program
and says that not only is it a 'means for the government to disown its responsibilities, but
also designed to blunt the RWAs and keep them from criticizing the governmentl 27. He
blamed members in the Joint Front for having close ties with the Congress Government
because of which they avoided direct confrontation with the government .28
An important characteristic of both these organizations is that neither have any
formal affiliations with political parties, as is typical of civil society groups in India (Harriss,
2005b and Chatterjee, 2004). People's Action is however clearly a political advocacy group.
The mechanisms of protests that People's Action uses are reminiscent of an opposition party
as opposed to Joint Front that seeks to involvement in government decision making as one
of the 'partners'. The sub-groups in People's Action are structured around different
population groups and institutions, like students, NGOs and RWAs'2 9 unlike Joint Front that
are structured around issues like planning and gender. While the membership of both
organizations comprises mostly of professionals, the (RWA) membership of Joint Front is
about half that of People's Action and mostly from RWAs in South Delhi, a relatively well
124 "RWAs reject DERC's new initiative to test meters", The Hindu, New Delhi, September 09, 2005
125 "Power tariff issue may derail Bhagidari system", The Hindu, New Delhi,, August 23, 2005
26 Kaul is a resident of Gurgaon, a suburb of Delhi
Personal interview with Pankaj Aggarwal, Secretary Joint Front [Delhi, February 2007]
127 "Delhi's angry Middle Class", Civil Society, New Delhi, September/ October 2005
12s One of the Joint Front directors was a close friend of Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister and Congress
Party Chief, the party currently in power in Delhi.
129 For example, United Residents Joint Action (URJA) group in People's Action comprised exclusively of
RWAs. 'United Students', is a youth group and New Delhi People's Alliance (NDPA) was created as a larger
pressure group comprising of NGOs, RWAs and Market and Trade bodies and unions.
off part of the city. People's Action has membership from all parts of the city. It is also
important to note that the head of People's Action has had experience in politics indirectly
as the Public Relations consultant for a prominent politician Pramod Mahajan who was a
Union Minister in the previous BJP led government. Joint Front represents the more
traditional 'watch-dog' role of the civil society: monitoring and checking actions of
government while remaining 'apolitical'.
People's Action, though also a self-appointed monitoring body, seeks to participant
in governance by becoming a part of it, the rationale being that 'it is up to the middle-class to
clean up the "dirty politics of this country 30o." People's Action organized Resident Welfare
Associations of Gurgaon to form the 'Gurgaon Resident's Party' to contest the Gurgaon
Assembly Elections in 2004. In Delhi, the organization mobilized RWAs to contest
Municipal Elections in March 2007. While the activities of RWA umbrella organizations are
similar, they are fragmented in their in ideology with respect to 'formal politics':
"A large number of representatives of the RWAs have suddenly started harbouring
political ambitions. They feel that if instead of the Councilors and MLAs, their own people
get elected they would be in a better position to resolve people's problems. This is the reason
why the RWA movement has got divided into pro and anti-Government groups," a senior
member of the RWAs remarked' 31."
This is a new and interesting development. Researchers studying neighborhood
associations and the middle-class in India have often pointed towards the social and cultural
visibility of this class, especially in recent years after the economic reforms, while
emphasizing its rather dormant role in the political sphere (Harriss, 2006, Fernandes, 2006).
This is probably beginning to change now. The next chapter will discuss the more direct role
of middle class neighborhood associations in local politics. I also try to understand 'who'
among the array of RWAs in Delhi is joining formal politics and why.
'30 Personal interview with Sanjay Kaul, President People's Action [Delhi, December 2006]
131 "Power tariff issue may derail Bhagidari system", The Hindu, New Delhi, August 23, 2005
Chapter 5
Middle Class Activism
and Local Politics
In the previous chapter I argued that factions in RWAs in Delhi reflect a
change in the traditional 'apolitical' role of middle class in India. In this chapter I try
to understand 'who' within the array of neighborhood associations in the city
decided to join formal politics. I also explore the 'indirect' means through which
neighborhood associations influence formal politics by influencing the behavior of
local political representatives. I argue that policies on decentralization adopted by
the Government of Delhi and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi have been
instrumental in this change.
In the last chapter I had discussed how contrary to common perception, Resident
Welfare Associations in Delhi are fragmented in their political ideology: While one umbrella
group chose to remain a critic of the government from 'outside', another mobilized RWAs
to contest local elections. This is interesting also because the middle class in India is
traditionally characterized by its distance from formal electoral politics. While the outcomes
of RWA activism discussed in Chapter 4 also have political consequences, this chapter
concentrates on the impact of Resident Welfare Associations on Local Municipal Politics,
both through direct and indirect means. By direct means, I refer to participation of RWAs in
local elections even though they are independent of any formal party affiliations. By indirect
I refer to influence of RWAs on the behavior of local political representatives.
5.1 RWAs and Electoral Politics
People's Action and its affiliate groups were the main organizations that mobilized
RWAs to enter politics. People's Action describes itself as a "lobby group for middle-class
interests since 'vote-bank politics'3 2' has marginalized the middle class. The rationale behind
132 Votebank politics is the practice of creating and maintaining votebanks [loyal bloc of voters from a single
community, who consistently back a certain candidate or political formation in democratic elections] through
divisive policies. As this brand of politics encourages voters to vote on the basis of narrow communal
considerations, often against their better judgment, it is considered inimical to democracy.
encouraging the middle class to contest elections was that it believed that it was up to the
middle class to "clean up the dirty politics in the countryl3 ". Although Delhi is the first large
city in India where neighborhood associations contested local elections, People's Action had
had prior experience in conducting a voter registration campaign in a suburban town of
Delhi called Gurgaon. The organization was also the instrumental in forming the organizing
RWAs in Gurgaon to form the 'Gurgaon Resident's Party' to contest the Assembly
Elections in 2004. People's Action was able to draw on its experience from Gurgaon for the
MCD elections in Delhi in 2007. Further, the head of People's Action had had indirect
experience in politics as the Public Relations consultant for a prominent politician (Pramod
Mahajan) who was a Union Minister in the previous BJP led government.
The process of preparing for the Municipal Elections began with constitution of
Resident Ward Committees. This eleven member committee comprised of RWAs and
influential persons in the ward. They were then registered with the Secretariat at People's
Action that managed the entire campaign. The main task of the Ward Committee was to
invite applications for candidature from the ward, scrutinize the applicants, conduct a
primary election and declare a consensus candidate. The candidate was then put up for
possible 'adoption' by any of the main political parties. While People's Action itself is not
affiliated with any of the political parties, it did allow for RWA candidates or candidates
chosen by RWAs to join major political parties. Their rationale behind this decision was that
they claimed that they wanted "clean and effective candidates" from the respective wards,
irrespective of political affiliations34 . People's Action saw its role as an 'independent
observer to ensure transparency and fairness' in the process. Sectors 11, 16 and 17 of Rohini
(one of the two wards I studied) were the first to have created Resident Ward Committees135 .
People's Action along with one of its affiliate organizations New Delhi People's
Action also started a process of mobilizing middle class residents to vote for the MCD
elections. By the end of this process about 250 RWAs came together to contest the
Municipal Elections in 21 wards. A related development that further encouraged RWAs to
participate in elections was the new delineation of ward boundaries according to population
size. The number of MCD wards increased from 132 to 272 ahead of the Municipal
133 Personal interview with Sanjay Kaul, President People's Action [Delhi, December 2006]
134 "RWAs' decision to fight polls worrying parties", The Hindu, New Delhi, 28th January 29, 2007
135 "RWAs gear up for participation in polls", The Hindu, New Delhi, February 02, 2007 and "Candidates
backed by RWAs intensify campaigning" The Hindu, New Delhi, March 23, 2007
Elections based on a population of roughly fifty thousand people. In many cases this
delineation created wards that comprised of middle class housing colonies, all of which had
strong RWAs. RWAs however did not win any seats in the elections.
Although Resident Welfare Associations contesting for local elections was a new
development in Delhi, a more important factor that determined election outcomes was the
issue of sealing of commercial establishments and Master Plan implementation (see section
4.3). Many unauthorized commercial properties were ultimately regularized by the Master
Plan while the Congress Party was still in power, but the protests and violence that led to
those changes in regulation worked against the government. It was observed that anti-
incumbency vote went largely in favor of the Bharatiya Janata Party that also led it to win the
2007 MCD elections.
There are still some interesting trends that we observe from the election results.
First, RWA candidates took the third position in five wards with a total of 5% of the total
aggregate votes. Second, as compared with other independent candidates, RWAs candidates
did better13 6. Third, middle class participation in wards where RWAs contested was higher
than other comparable wards and than previous years1 37. It may not be possible to speculate
on the significance of these trends, but the process through which development were shaped
could unfold some interesting insights into the political behavior of RWAs.
5.2 Political Typology of RWAs
The broad reason that RWAs and organizations like People's Action and URJA cite
for middle class associations entering politics is the desire to change the clientelistic nature of
politics in India that had marginalized the middle class. But all RWAs are middle class in
nature; yet all are not contesting elections. In fact the other large RWA umbrella
organization, Joint Front, is very critical of this development. The following statement made
by the President of Joint Front reflects their disapproval:
"If RWAs start contesting elections, what would be the difference between us and
the political parties? Out job is to assist residents in sorting out local problems and that is
our only scope of functioning. Getting into politics would only dismantle the unity of
136 "RWAs make significant presence", The Hindu, New Delhi, April 09, 2007
137 "RWA candidates fared well in polls", The Hindu, New Delhi, April 20, 2007
RWAs. Similar attempts have failed in Gurgaon, and RWAs doing so would only become
another political front138"
So why did some RWAs contest elections while others did not? In order to answer
this question, it might be useful to study the relationship between RWAs and political
representatives. I observed that this relationship is not the same across different
neighborhoods. Most RWAs and councilors can not get along at all, some do not like each
other but work together anyway, while a few have learned to become friends. I would
classify RWAs into three categories respectively: adversarial, antagonistic cooperation and
politically savvy. But before I describe the three types of RWAs, it is important to
understand the external developments that have shaped the dynamics of the relationship
between political representatives and RWAs in recent years.
The most significant change in governance in the last five years has been through
policies on decentralization by both the Delhi and Central Government. Intervention by the
Delhi government with the Bhagidari program, a form of decentralization, led to a
significant increase in the level of interaction between RWAs and political representatives
(see section 3.2.2). At another level, the MCD has been pushing for greater decentralization
in its own administration in recent years. The councilors and MLAs have traditionally been
provided with constituency funds to spend for development related work in their respective
wards. In the last five years, the Councilor Local Development Fund amount has been
incrementally increased from US$85,000 (35 lakhs INR) in 2002 to about US$250,000 (1
crore INR) in 2006. Political representatives enjoy a considerable level of discretion in
allocation of that amount. Although the MCD continues to be a primarily technocratic
organization and governance in Delhi is still very centralized (see section 3.2.3), Municipal
councilors and MLAs have acquired greater executive powers in their areas through this
financial devolution" 9. The increase in funds has resulted in councilors being able to invest
in some capital investments and not just minor maintenance works. These two
developments have reinforced the interaction and tension between political representatives
138 "Politicos face local resistance in MCD polls", The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 28, 2007
139 The MCD has two branches: Executive and Deliberative. The 'Executive Wing' is the technocratic part of
the organization that comprises of civil servant [Commissioner, Additional Commissioner, Heads of
Departments, Deputy Commissioners and Administrative Officers]. The 'Deliberative Wing' comprises of the
Mayor and Statutory Committees and Sub-Committees comprising of elected Councilors. As in most Indian
cities, the 'Executive Wing' in MCD has more administrative and decision making powers than the deliberative
wing.
and RWAs. RWAs have as a result become more demanding of local political representatives
in recent years.
5.2.1 Adversarial
In most planned neighborhoods in Delhi there is a bitter relationship between
RWAs and local political representatives. Because of the administrative mechanisms
introduced by the Bhagidari program (most importantly creation of 'Bhagidari Cells' and
'Nodal Officers'), a parallel system of governance has begun to emerge (see section 3.2.3).
This had in a way eliminated the role of political representatives as a medium between
resident and government officials. Most political representatives, councilors as well as
Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs), feel that Bhagidari is encroaching into their area
of operation and hence feel threatened. A professor of planning who has been studying
RWAs for the last few years told me that the relationship between RWAs and political
representatives is so bitter that they [councilors] would not even pick up their cell phones if
they know that RWAs were calling'4 .
I would describe most of the RWAs I interviewed in the North Delhi ward as
sharing an adversarial relationship with their councilors. This ward comprises of middle class
residents (both traders and professionals) and some slum settlements. Both the councilor
and MLA in the ward belong to the BJP Party that has traditionally attracted middle class
trader votes. The RWAs I interviewed, however, were professionals (median household
income of US$400-500 per month). The main reason for conflict between local political
representatives and RWAs in this ward was regarding budget expenditure decisions. RWAs
blamed the councilor and MLA of corruption and nepotism and felt that the government
should transfer funds directly to RWAs for development work in their neighborhoods rather
than channeling it through political representatives. It is interesting to observe that Joint
Front, on the other hand, had opposed a Government of Delhi proposal that would have
allotted 30% of the property tax to RWAs for civil dutieS141. RWAs in this ward complained
that since the both the councilor and the MLA belonged to the business (banjya) community,
a disproportionate share of the budget went into neighborhoods of traders. They also said
140 Personal interview with Prof. Sridharan, Department of Urban Planning, School of Planning and
Architecture [January, 2007]
141 "The best future for RWAs is as urban panchayats", CivilSociety, New Delhi, September/ October 2005
that the political representatives favored the trader caste while issuing contracts for
construction works in the ward. These RWAs that I interviewed were affiliated with People's
Action142. They were also the first RWAs in Delhi to register for local MCD elections.
As discussed earlier, the administrative mechanisms created by Bhagidari translated
into RWAs being able to influence political representatives through the executive wing of
the MCD. I observed an interesting development in this ward. RWAs told me that the
councilor had created 'fake RWAs' that would invalidate the complaints made by RWAs in
their neighborhoods. This was possible because there is no separate legislation that guides
the membership guidelines for RWAs. RWAs are registered under the Societies Registration
Act of 1860 that also applies to civic associations of all kinds (including NGOs and
Community Based Organizations). Any seven individuals according to this Act can form an
RWA. While the 'Bhagidari Cell' in MCD and the Delhi Government allowed RWAs to
lodge complaints against government officials and political representatives, RWAs created by
the councilor were able to find a way around this mechanism. The councilor, on the other
hand, believed that RWAs were undemocratic and undermined him who is elected by the
mandate of the people. He also blamed RWAs for trying to 'blackmail' him through the
Bhagidari program 43.
What is intrinsic to this shift in the power balance between RWAs and councilors in
this ward is the assumption that neighborhood associations access political representatives
for problem solving. This is different from RWAs in the South Delhi ward where some of
the RWAs did not even know their local councilor prior to the Bhagidari workshops. The
tension between RWAs and political representatives has further intensified with greater
financial powers of MLAs and councilors enjoy now.
5.2.2 Antagonistic Cooperation
Some RWAs and councilor in the South Delhi ward do not like each other (for
similar reasons described in the North Delhi ward), but work together anyway. This was
surprising. The neighborhood I describe here is one of the most prime residential properties
in the city, and possibly also the country. The area was developed in 1972 for retired civil
servants. Back then, it lay in the outskirts of the city. Since most of the residents at the time
142 Personal interview with RWAs of Rohini Sectors 17, 11, 14, 12 [Delhi, January, February, 2007]
143 Telephonic interview with councilor of Ward 33 [Delhi, February, 2007]
were civil servants, they used their informal networks within public agencies for delivery of
services and infrastructure. The period from 1985 onwards saw an increase in land values in
the area. Many of the original residents sold their properties to businessmen. The density in
the neighborhood increased. Many private schools and foreign embassies moved to the
neighborhood, which further shot up property values. The RWA in the neighborhood
described their job as making sure that the area remains 'the top colony in Delhi; the aim is
not to ensure minimal, but optimum services' 44' . The councilor in the ward is a resident of
the Munirka Urban Village and belongs to an economically backward caste (Scheduled
Caste145). Most of his voters are from the village and slum and resettlement colonies in the
ward. He contested local elections for the first time in 2004 with a Congress Party ticket and
won, probably because of anti-incumbency.
In order to ensure that the neighborhood gets these optimal services, the RWA in
this neighborhood uses own internal funds (annual fee collected from residents), services by
private corporations who have businesses in the neighborhood as Corporate Social
Responsibility (for example, maintenance of public parks, back lanes, sponsoring public
events etc), and government officials and political representative in government agencies.
But what distinguishes this RWA is its access to the top bureaucracy and political leadership
in government agencies. Most of the residents in this neighborhood do not vote. In fact the
RWA met with the councilor for the first time during a Bhagidari workshop. But local
political representatives were often accessed indirectly through high level government
officials in the MCD or senior Congress party politicians in the Delhi Government. This was
perhaps the main cause of tension between the councilor and the RWA. Since the Councilor
Local Development Funds had increased in the last few years, the RWAs needed these funds
for development work. The councilor on the other hand did not want to displease his
superiors in the agency (since the executive wing in the MCD continues to be stronger than
the deliberative wing) and the Party. While describing the relationship with the local
councilor, the RWA President of the neighborhood said, "Of course he [councilor] is
unhappy; I can call his boss and he will have to bend".
144 Personal interview with RWA Vasant Vihar [Delhi, February, 2007]
145 A third of the municipal seats are reserved for Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe [ST/SC] candidates. This
seat during the election year was reserved for ST/ SCs
The second cause of tension was the RWA's demands to evict informal settlements/
businesses from public spaces in the neighborhood. This includes hawkers selling food
products on the streets, local laundry vendors [dhobiwala] in pavements, newspaper vendors
etc. The RWA described encroachments as a nexus between 'illegal squatters, the councilor
and local police'. It is interesting to observe that the RWA in this neighborhood is affiliated
with Joint Front, the main RWA umbrella organization that approached the Courts for
action against unauthorized commercial establishments. This RWA was in fact one of its
founding members. The councilor, however, saw their demand about slum eviction as
something that would hurt his constituency. Responding to my question about informal
settlements, he said, "I have to take care of all people in my constituency; I am a poor
people's manl46"
5.2.3 The Political Savvy RWA
RWAs and councilors at best manage to get along somehow, as observed above, but
a symbiotic relationship between the two is rare. I had spent a few days observing the
councilor in the South Delhi ward (he showed me around his ward, allowed me to sit in his
meeting with constituents, political advisors, government officials...I basically followed him
around all day for a few days!). A television news channel came to interview him once. The
interview was set within a public meeting; the public included slum residents in the ward, his
political supporters, the opposition and representatives of RWAs. This was surprising
because such meetings are usually not attended by middle class associations. I was even more
surprised by the open public support of the RWA in television. Later I interviewed the
RWA.
This neighborhood was similar with respect to occupations and income
characteristics to other neighborhoods in the South Delhi ward (with a median income of
US$850- 1450 per month) but what distinguished this neighborhood was its history of
association with political representatives. Many of the development works done within and
outside the neighborhood were because of the support of politicians. This allowed the RWA
to charge a much lower fee to its residents (US$10 as opposed to US$60 annually in a
comparable neighborhood). While it is true that this neighborhood always had networks with
146 He was referring to that fact that most of the ward residents who vote for him in local elections happen to
be poor.
politicians, but these networks were often with high level politicians at the Delhi
Government or at the Central Government level. The reason that the RWA in this
neighborhood is now working with the councilor was because the councilor in recent years
has more financial powers to influence development work.
I was surprised that RWA members in the neighborhood encouraged residents to
vote for the councilor in local elections. It is important to note that much of the population
in this ward is middle class and the councilor is looking to expand his support base beyond
the limited slum/regularized settlements in the ward. For this purpose, he conducts
development work in both slum settlements and middle class neighborhoods. For example,
he invested on sanitation, schools and other basic facilities in the urban villages and slum
settlements in the ward but also funded waste-water treatment plants, developed ornamental
gardens and upgraded roads and other infrastructure in middle-class neighborhoods.
Secondly, since most middle class residents do not participate in political rallies and
elections, he used signage (with his name) on all development work that he conducted in the
ward as a means to market himself.
5.3 Which RWAs joined politics and why? What did the others do?
The relationship between RWAs and political representatives point to the motivation
behind some RWAs to contest local elections. RWA in the elite neighborhood (5.2.2) is able
to control the councilor indirectly through its high networks in government agencies. The
behavior of RWA in this neighborhood with respect to informal settlements is consistent
with the argument about neighborhood associations and urban public space put forth by
Fernandes (2006) and Chatterjee (2004). Most of the residents in the neighborhood are
employed in large multinational firms and organizations, many being the some of the richest
people in the city. The goal of the RWA (and residents) was therefore also to make the
neighborhood more exclusionary and free of any visible signs of poverty.
The third case (of the politically savvy RWA) is an exception but points towards the
changing demographic characteristics of the South Delhi ward. Because of its location, the
ward is currently going through gentrification and the slum and low income residents are
now being replaced by middle class residents, most of who do not vote. Investing in middle
class neighborhood is a means for the councilor to expand his voter base. The neighborhood
sees the councilor as a source of funds since policies on decentralization has given more
financial powers to local political representatives. The RWAs in the North Delhi ward,
however, neither enjoy the high networks in government agencies, and nor are able to exert
direct control over local politicians because of caste/class affiliations or.
The political typology of RWAs suggests that RWAs with pre-existing networks with
government agencies are more likely to remain apolitical. These networks could be at the top
(with senior bureaucrats and politicians), as observed in elite neighborhoods, that these
associations leverage for service delivery and in influencing local political representatives
indirectly. Members of such associations are more likely to assume the traditional 'watch-
dog' role of 'civil society'. 'Direct' networks between the middle class and local political
representatives exist based on caste and occupation (in neighborhoods with strong trading
communities). This is reminiscent of networks between residents and politicians observed in
informal settlements. Neighborhood associations without these social networks seek to
become part of the government machinery through formal electoral channels 47.
Interestingly, these neighborhood associations, like the ones involved in activism through
umbrella organizations, also comprise of professionals. Activism by neighborhood
associations at the city level was an important contributing factor in this mobilization.
Another factor has been decentralization of governance, devolution of financial and decision
making powers to local political representatives, which makes participation in local politics
more significant than before.
While some RWAs are influencing local electoral politics directly by contesting
elections, others are able to influence the behavior of local political representatives as
observed in both neighborhoods in the South Delhi ward. This has been an outcome of
policies on decentralization that have made local political representatives more powerful in
one hand and also facilitated greater interaction between citizen groups and political
representatives. During the same period, mobilization of RWAs at the city level through
umbrella organizations like the Joint Front and People's Action made RWAs very powerful
in influencing government decisions. This had some impact in their roles at the local ward
level as well. Although the bargaining power of RWAs is a function of pre-existing networks
of RWAs and government officials in the respective agencies, I observed that all RWAs had
147 The other RWAs that contested municipal elections are from neighborhoods like Vishnu Garden, Bindapur,
Shalimar Bagh, Rajendra Nagar, Dwarka and North Delhi which had very similar demographic characteristics
as the North Delhi ward that I studied. This seems to suggest that my argument about RWA networks in
Government agencies and RWA participation in local elections could have external validity.
become more demanding of Local Area Development Funds across all neighborhoods. This
is reflected in changes in public expenditure patterns at the ward level. For example, the
expenditure on middle class neighborhoods in the South Delhi ward has increased from
US$88,000 (36 lakh INR) in 2002-03 to US$112 (46 INR) in 2006-07. In the North Delhi
ward, it increased from US$144 (59 lakks INR) to US$181 (74 lakhs INR) in the same
period. This is a percentage increase in 45% and 73% in just five years (Refer Annex 2).
Table 5.1 Ward Characteristic vs. Political Outcomes in Elections
Voter Turnout Outcome on Political
Ward Population Main voter Rate* Ward Outcome in
(MCD Elections) Expenditure 2007 Elections
South Middle-High Slum 1997: 23.5% Greater Same.
Delhi income residents (BJP) expenditure on Some middle
(Ward 16) professionals. 2002: 32.5% middle class class residents
Some slum (Congress) neighborhoods begin to vote
settlements (BJP wins)
North Middle income Traders and 1997: 37% No major RWAs contest
Delhi professionals. Slum (BJP) change in MCD elections
(Ward 33) Traders. Residents 2002: 43.6% pattern (BJP wins)
Some slum (BJP)
settlements
*Source: State Election Commission, Delhi
5.4 RWAs and the Urban Poor
Urban Space: The first major impact of neighborhood associations on the urban
poor is spatial, as reflected by slum eviction in large Indian cities. This argument is based on
the literature on 'globalizing cities and the middle class' that describe neighborhood
associations as hegemonic institutions that seek to redefine the use of urban public spaces by
dislocating the urban poor from close to their visual proximity. I observed this development
in certain elite neighborhoods in Delhi (see section 4.1).
Public Expenditure: As discussed earlier, RWAs have become more demanding of
ward level development funds by local political representatives (municipal councilors). In
mega-cities like Delhi, where millions of dollars are pumped in for large infrastructure
project especially in recent years, the councilor's fund constitutes a minuscule proportion of
the city budget. But this could have significant impact on service delivery for the urban poor
because political representatives are the primary means through which the urban poor access
the State. In the two wards that I studied, I observed that while decentralization has given
greater financial powers to local political representative, middle class neighborhoods have
taken up a larger share of this increase in resources (See Annex 2)
Bhagidari: Another outcome of the rise of RWAs is that the focus of Bhagidari has
now been shifted to other sectors like education and health, and most recently on informal
settlements. This is an interesting development because the reasons why Bhagidari was
restricted to the middle class planned parts of the city still hold. This program was
conceptualized in the summer of 2006 and detailed guidelines for implementation were been
worked out by November 2006. Another NGO (that specializes in working on low-income/
squatter communities) was commissioned to work out the implementation strategy.
There are two reasons on why the program is implemented one. The first is to shift
the focus away from RWAs that in recent years have become very critical of the government.
Second, working in slum is more complex than in planned areas. The experience with
RWAs, which is perhaps more manageable, would have allowed these institutions to learn
and hence make government officials better prepared for this more challenging task. More
importantly, the program is timed right before the assembly elections in 2008. It is
interesting to note that the program was publicized in a big way months before the last
election.
The program is designed to start with 20 pilot projects. The focus in the first phase
would be on resettlement colonies because land titles are not disputed here. The idea is to
improve educational and vocational training institutions and health centers in order to
improve the quality of life and employment potential in these neighborhoods. Phase II
would be to figure out a way to resettle existing unauthorized colonies through partnering
with local community institutions148. The slums selected for the program are either towards
the outskirts of the city where relocation is not imminent or are planned to be relocated
soon.
148 Interview with Mr. Yadav, Special Secretary to Chief Minister [Chief Minister's Office, Delhi, July 2006]
Chapter 6
Concluding thoughts...
In this chapter seeks to answer research questions introduced at the
beginning of the thesis. I try to understand the factors behind the implementation of
the Bhagidari program and the resultant (unintended) political impacts. I explore how
middle-class neighborhood associations are beginning to influence public policy
both through direct and indirect means and identify the external factors that have
been instrumental in this change. I also speculate on what these developments could
mean for the future of Indian cities.
I had asked four questions at the beginning of this research. The first question was
about Bhagidari, a Government of Delhi program that institutionalized citizen government
participation in governance through neighborhood associations or Resident Welfare
Associations (RWAs). I was interested to find out the reasons why the program was
implemented and its (unintended) political impacts behind image of success that Bhagidari
has come to embody. The second question related to the rise in power of Resident Welfare
Associations. I was interested in the factors that led to collective action by RWAs and the
ways in which they influenced public policy outcomes. The third question was about advent
of RWAs into formal politics. Within the array of RWAs in Delhi, I wanted to find out who
were contesting for local elections. The last question was about the contextual factors that
have influenced these developments: Bhagidari as well the rise of RWAs. I will lay down the
contextual variables (question four) before I begin to answer the first three questions.
6.1 The Contextual Variables
What are the other contextual factors that have influenced these
developments: Bhagidari and the Rise of RWAs?
The roots of changes in government policies like Bhagidari and the rise of
neighborhood associations lies in Economic Reforms Policy that the Government of India
instituted in early nineties. There were two defining characteristics of these reforms: one,
lesser government control [liberalization and privatization] and two, opening up of the
economy to foreign capital [globalization]. These reforms have had important implications
on the governance and socio-economic characteristics of metropolitan cities.
On the public policy side majority of the investment, especially foreign investment, is
now concentrated in mega-cities like Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore. The urban policy as a
result has become more pro-growth reflected by the investments in large infrastructure
projects in metro-cities, as opposed to policies targeted at 'de-congesting' cities in the 70s
and 80s. This is reflected in huge investments in infrastructure in cities to create conditions
for foreign investment and production for the global market. The 'National Urban Renewal
Mission', a US$1350 Million national urban development program on infrastructure
upgradation, for example is a reflection of this change. Secondly, due to the structural
reform policies [decentralization] adopted the Federal and State governments, which some
argue is an extension of the economic reform policy (Kundu, 2003), there have been changes
in the way cities are now governed. Although the Central Government continues to maintain
significant control over large cities because their impact on macroeconomic growth, local
governments have assumed more decision making and financial powers in recent years. City
governments are now expected to generate own resources to finance urban development. A
parallel development is privatization of service delivery on grounds of greater efficiency
and accountability. There is now a greater focus on service delivery models that are based on
cost-recovery in an effort to cut on government subsidies.
On the socio-economic side, the reforms have led to rapid economic growth in the
last fifteen years. It has been argued that the gains of this growth have been differentially
distributed. While the overall size of the middle class (and hence the markets) has increased,
there has been an exponential growth in incomes in sections of the middle class - the
professional and the managerial class that is connected to agents of global capital.
Neighborhood associations too are principally middle class in nature. Another outcome of
economic liberalization had been growth in the mass media, both print and electronic (in
contrast to one State owned channel earlier). Competition between television channels and
newspapers has led to localization in media and given space for discourse on city level public
policies and politics.
The economic reforms and the changes it brought about in governance and society
set the contextual framework for this thesis. I have tried to establish a relationship between
middle-class activism, exemplified by the rise in neighborhood associations, and local
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politics in mega-cities using the case of Delhi. Delhi makes for an interesting study not only
because it embodies the larger socio-economic changes that are transforming urban India,
but also because of radical changes that have been instituted in the governance of the city in
an effort to make it more responsive to citizens. This was done through institutionalization
of citizen participation in governance through a program called Bhagidari. The partners
include neighborhood associations in the middle-class 'planned' parts of the city.
The distinction between 'planned' and 'informal' is key to understanding the
variation in state-society relationship across different fragments of the city. Partha Chatterjee
(2005) draws a distinction between the 'political society' and the 'civil society' in India.
Civil society, he argues, is founded on 'popular sovereignty and grants equal rights to
citizens' (as tax-payers). Political society is the 'line connecting populations to governmental
agencies pursuing multiple policies of security and welfare' (as voters). He argues that
"politics is often the only resource in a system which many deny the benefits of policy
decisions or legal remedies to the poor". Voting patterns for local municipal elections in
Delhi support this theoretical argument indicating that poor residents see political
representatives as the main channel for making their voices heard (Baud, Sridharan, Pfeffer,
2006). Harriss too in his study of civic associations in Delhi observes that urban poor most
commonly address problem-solving through meditation by political parties while the middle-
class is more active in associational life like Resident Welfare Associations (Harriss, 2005a).
The middle class, according to Chatterjee's definition, forms part of the civil society. It
accesses the State primarily through the channels of the judiciary and bureaucracy, as
opposed formal electoral politics.
6.2 Bhagidariand its Impacts
What have been the reasons behind the implementation of the
Bhagidari programs and the (unintended) political impacts after it was
implemented?
Implementation of Bhagidari The Bhagidari program is radical in the sense that
such an initiative to institutionalize citizen-government participation [by a government
agency] had never been tried at a large scale in any Indian city before. The reason why the
program could be implemented was because it gained support from both senior political
leaders and bureaucrats. The support from bureaucrats is explained by the fact that Bhagidari
is credited to be the brainchild of a senior civil servant in the Delhi Government. But there
are many programs that policy analysts and civil servants recommend that are unable to find
political support. The reason why the Chief Minister adopted Bhagidari may be explained by
the unique institutional environment of Delhi. Being the Capital city, Delhi is dominated
by Federal Government institutions. The limited decision making power in the capital is
shared amongst political representatives from three levels of government (Central, State and
Municipal) which provides very little political space for another level of government that
could involve citizens. Bhagidari institutionalized citizen participation at the level of the
neighborhood without changing any formal political structures. Hence it was in a way able to
fill a space that formal policies on decentralization like the 74th Constitutional Amendment
Act instituted by the Center were not able to do so. More importantly, Bhagidari was a most
visible means for the Chief Minister to publicize the workings of her government and hence
exert its presence in the city. This gains even more significance since Bhagidari was
implemented when the major opposition party, BJP, was in power at the Central
Government.
The program is credited with improving government responsiveness and service
delivery as reflected by the number of national and international awards that it has received.
This perception of success has influenced policies on governance at both state and national
levels in India and led to launching of similar programs. While the program does reflect how
city governments are becoming more responsive to citizens, the political implications of the
program have not been very well understood. The political implications correspond to the
program's impact on government officials, political representatives and Resident Welfare
Associations.
Government Officials: The heterogeneity in government officials across and within
agencies results in different levels of responsiveness. Officials from government agencies
under the Delhi government responded to the program better because administrative
mechanisms like special 'Bhagidari Cells' that were tied to the Chief Minister's Office. This
was not possible in agencies accountable directly to the Central Government. Secondly, the
program faced resistance from officials from Central Government agencies like the Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) and Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) who were
senior to their counterparts in the Delhi Government. It is however important not to draw
any causal links between responsiveness of government agencies in Bhagidari and agency
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performance (as measured by citizen perception). I observed that a most agencies with single
tasks tend to have a better perception. Secondly, agencies involved with more important
roles in development and maintenance work and greater levels of interaction with RWAs
tended to do poorly in perception surveys, even though some of the sectors they worked in
seem to have improved. The second important distinction in responsiveness is between
different levels of government officials. Evaluation studies on Bhagidari conclude that mid-
level officials are less inclined to be involved in the program (GoI, 2003). Lack of awareness
of the program is cited as the most important reason behind it. This is true to an extent, but
I observed that degree of interaction between different kind of government officials and
RWAs is possibly a more useful explanation. High-level officials like department heads are
mostly involved in administrative responsibilities that do not require much interaction with
citizens and lower level staff primarily works on the field. Bhagidari was an added burden on
mid-level officials who had to go out of their way to meet with RWAs in addition to
fieldwork and administrative work.
Political Representatives: Although the program was implemented without making
any formal changes in the political power structures in the city and the Congress Party was in
power at both the State and Municipal level, Bhagidari led to a tug of war between the Delhi
Government and councilors from the MCD. This was because local political representatives
saw Bhagidari as an 'indirect means' that the Chief Minister was employing to intrude into
their political space. The administrative mechanisms that the program introduced put RWAs
in direct contact with government officials thus creating a parallel system of governance that
undermined local elected politicians. This also led to friction between political
representatives and RWAs. The program was however instrumental in bringing middle class
neighborhood association and local politicians (MCD councilors and Members of Legislative
Assembly) to the same forum, sometimes for the first time.
6.3 Rise of Resident Welfare Associations
What are the factors that led to collective action by Resident Welfare
Associations and how did they influence public policy outcomes?
Dominant Explanation: The recent body of literature on the rise of middle class in
India focuses on the impact neighborhood associations on the use of urban public space.
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Fernandes argues that the newness of the middle class, as an outcome of economic growth,
is marked by its 'social and cultural visibility'. The middle class acts as the primary agent of
the globalizing city and nation that 'seeks to reproduce a clear socio-spatial separation from
groups such as street vendors and squatters'. Neighborhood associations, she argues, is a
mechanism through which this separation is achieved as reflected by slum evictions in a
number of large Indian cities. Chatterjee ties this development to economic liberalization
and argues that it is a result 'circulation of images of global cities through cinema, television,
and the internet as well as through the India middle classes' far greater access to international
travel'. The main impact of this mobilization, according to this theory, is on the use of
urban public space. I observe that while this argument is true for elite neighborhood
associations in Delhi, perhaps a greater impact of middle class activism has been on public
policy outcomes in the city.
Middle Class Activism: By Middle Class Activism, I refer to large scale
mobilization by RWAs that was geared towards changing public policy decisions towards its
favor. The middle class in India is active in associations but mobilization by these
associations is rare. Two RWA umbrella organizations, Joint Front and People's Action were
at the forefront of this mobilization in Delhi. I refer to three cases that exemplify activism by
RWAs. In the first case, RWAs protested against the increase in electricity user-charges after
the privatization of the Delhi Electricity Board (DVB). The role of the media as a means for
creating support for the protest and also as a medium to bargain with the government
agencies was crucial in this case. This led to Government of Delhi to revert to the old
electricity rates. The second case involves protests against a World Bank recommendation to
privatize the city's water utility agency (DJB). Although this protest was mostly led by NGOs
and social activists (who have mostly concentrated on the poor), RWA support for the
protest led the Delhi Government to withdraw from the project. The third case involves
protest against regularization of 'unauthorized' commercial establishments in the city by the
Master Plan. This development led to tension between RWAs and the trader community in
the city who owned the unauthorized shops. This case reveals that although RWAs are
prominent in most middle class parts of the city, including ones the inhabited by the
business community, RWA Activism by is primarily led by professionals. It is also an
example of 'judiciary' as one of the most important channels that which the middle class
uses to control the State by invoking discourses of citizen' rights and public interest. This is
not only because of its knowledge of the law and access to resources, but also because law is
at times the only course for the middle class because it is outnumbered by the more
politically active community of traders and the urban poor. This may be because the
occupations of traders and the poor are not always based on the same structures of legality
as the professional class.
Factors behind Activism: Three important factors contributed to mobilization by
Resident Welfare Associations. First, all RWAs that led the protests are tied by a single
class identity. All RWAs are middle class in nature, but the RWAs that led the protest are
also part of the professional class. Many of their activities are not only defined by their
interests, but also against other social groups. Second, a trend that runs across most cases
is that this activism has been triggered by some form of privatization of service delivery
which resulted in (or was believed to result in) increase in user charges. RWA activism is
hence a reaction against changes in modes of service delivery from a subsidy-based model
whose beneficiaries, it has been argued (in South Asia), were most often the middle class.
Third, Bhagidari has been instrumental in bringing RWAs under one umbrella as the
prime representatives of 'civil society'. The media focus on RWAs too was a byproduct of
the publicity campaign of the Bhagidari program, which has been an important reason behind
the program's implementation.
Fragmented Middle Class: Middle Class Activism is explained as a response to the
impotence of the middle class in the 'political sphere' as it begins to devote its energies to
activism in 'civil society' (Harriss, 2000b). I observed that the 'apolitical' nature of the middle
class is beginning to change now. This is reflected in the difference in ideologies of the two
largest groups of RWA umbrella organizations that developed in the city as a consequence of
the 'power hike protest'. Even though both had similar opinion on public policy issues and
used similar mechanisms for protest, one group assumed the traditional 'watch-dog' of the
State role of civil society; another developed into a 'political advocacy' group. The later also
mobilized neighborhood associations to contest municipal elections. This was the first such
development in any large city in India.
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6.4 Resident Welfare Associations and Formal Politics
Why are some RWAs contesting local elections while others are not?
Political Typology of RWAs: The answer to this question possibly lies in the
relationship between RWAs and political representatives that varies across different wards.
An important factor that has shaped this relationship has been policies on decentralization
by both the Delhi and Central Government. Intervention by the Delhi government with the
Bhagidari program led to a significant increase in the level of interaction between RWAs and
political representatives. Decentralization in the MCD has led to greater financial devolution
to local political representatives. These developments have made RWAs more demanding of
local councilors. I observed three main
that most RWAs and councilors can not get along, some do not like each other but
work together anyway, while a few have learned to become friends. I have classified them
into three categories respectively: adversarial, antagonistic cooperation and politically savvy.
Who joined politics? Neighborhood associations with pre-existing networks with
government agencies are more likely to remain apolitical. These networks could be at the top
(with senior bureaucrats and politicians), as observed in elite neighborhoods, that these
associations leverage for service delivery and in influencing local political representatives
indirectly. Members of such associations are more likely to assume the traditional 'watch-
dog' role of 'civil society'. I observe 'direct' networks between the middle class and local
political representatives exist based on caste and occupation (in neighborhoods with strong
trading communities). This is reminiscent of networks between residents and politicians
observed in informal settlements. Neighborhood associations without these social networks
seek to become part of the government machinery through formal electoral channels.
Interestingly, these neighborhood associations, like the ones involved in activism through
umbrella organizations, also comprise of professionals. Activism by neighborhood
associations at the city level was an important contributing factor in this mobilization.
Another factor has been decentralization of governance, devolution of financial and decision
making powers to local political representatives, which makes participation in local politics
more significant than before.
RWAs and Urban Poor: Neighborhood associations affect formal politics
'indirectly' by influencing the behavior of local political representatives. This is reflected by
greater public spending on middle-class neighborhoods in recent years, since the start of
Bhagidari and developments surrounding the program. Policies on decentralization instituted
by both the Federal and State Governments have been instrumental in this change.
Interestingly, this observation however holds greater significance for those neighborhood
associations that are more likely to be 'apolitical': those that do not have affiliation to any of
the political parties but control their representatives through 'high networks'. This could
have important consequences for service delivery for informal settlements because political
representatives are the primary means through which the urban poor access the State. A
positive externality could be extension of the Bhagidari program to informal settlements. This
is partly a result of experience that Government of Delhi and other government agencies
gathered after working with middle class citizen groups for seven years. More importantly, it
is a means for the government to shift its focus from citizen groups that have turned against
it, while continuing to be associated with a high-profile program that won it political support
previously. The focus of this new program would however be on regularized and
resettlement colonies where land tenure or legality is not in question.
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ANNEX 1
Questionnaires'49
1(a): Questionnaire for Resident Welfare Associations
Member Information:
1. Name:
2. Office Position/Area:
3. Occupation:
4. Age:
5. Educational qualifications:
6. How long have you served as an officer?
7. Contact Information:
Neighborhood characteristics:
1. Population:
2. Main occupation:
3. Income Range:
4. Tenure Status:
5. Renter/ Owners:
6. When was colony built?
7. How old is RWA?
8. Why was it set up?
RWA Elections and Membership:
1. How are nominations made?
2. Criteria for nomination:
3. How many nominations for (how many) office positions?
4. In case of voting, how many residents show up?
5. Background/ Occupation of other members:
6. Why join RWA? (incentive)
7. How long do they stay in office?
8. Have new people been interested to nominate themselves as members?
9. New RWAs after Bhagidari?
10. Who do they represent?
11. Is the RWA a member of an federation of RWAs/ umbrella org?
a. If so, which one?
b. Since when?
c. Why did it join?
d. What is their role?
e. Activities participated in:
12. How many RWAs in the ward?
Functions:
Before Bhagidad (post 2000):
1. Main roles and responsibility:
2. Main types of complaints?
149 These questionnaires were meant as a tool to guide interviewing and not designed with the purpose of
statistical analysis
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3. Biggest achievements:
a. Issue:
b. Method used for solution:
c. Number of meetings/ visits?
d. Time taken to solve:
e. Breakthrough:
4. Examples of development projects and maintenance:
a. Who did residents approach in case of water problems?
b. How were complaints processed?
5. Who did residents contact to register complaints? RWAs or councilor?
6. What was the role of political representatives?
a. Councilor:
b. MLA
c. MP
7. Biggest barriers/ challenges:
8. Issue:
a. Method used:
b. Why it didn't work?
c. Lesson learnt during problem solving: what works?
9. Did you know officials in MCD/ DDA/ Delhi government earlier?
a. If so, how?
Post-Bhagidari (2000 onwards)
1. Have any new responsibilities been added?
(eg. collecting bills?)
2. What is the process of registering complaints now?
3. Who do residents approach?
4. How many times has the RWA complained to Bhagidari Cell?
a. What reasons?
5. Main works since 2000?
6. (slum evictions/ removal of encroachments/ hawkers)
7. Has the colony undertaken any works under bhagidari (parks, rainwater harvesting etc)?
a. Who took the initiative?
b. What was the agency's role?
c. Did residents arrange finance for this?
d. What was the councilor's role?
8. What is the role of local MLA/ councilor? Has the interaction changed? Cooperating now?
9. Main achievements on Bhagidari?
10. Drawbacks?
Service delivery:
Has there been an improvement in services after Bhagidari?
Which services?
Responsible Agency Reasons for improvement
Water supply
Solid waste management
Parks
Sewage
Roads
Security
Electricity
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1(b): Questionnaire for Slum Settlements
Head Information:
1. Name:
2. Occupation:
3. Age:
4. Educational qualifications:
5. How long have you served as pradhan?
6. Contact Information:
Settlement characteristics:
1. Population:
2. Main occupation:
3. Income Range:
4. When was the settlement built?
5. Where did the people come from?
6. Legal status:
a. Ration Card
b. Other documentation
7. Main issues:
Membership/ Elections:
1. Main roles and responsibility:
2. Number of hrs spent per week on cluster work?
3. Criteria to become a pradhan
4. How do residents decide on who will become pradhan?
5. Are there any nominations and voting?
6. How many people show up?
7. Why did you choose to take up this position?
8. How long is the pradhan in office?
9. How do they decide to change?
Functions/ Relationship with political representative:
10. Main roles and responsibility:
11. Does s\he know any politicians? How? Did s\he know them before becoming pradhan?
12. Affiliations with a political party?
13. Examples of development projects and maintenance:
a. Who did residents approach in case of water problems?
b. How were complaints processed?
14. Who do residents contact to register complaints? Political representative or government
departments?
15. Main types of complaints?
16. Biggest achievements:
a. Issue:
b. Method used for solution:
c. Number of meetings/ visits?
d. Time taken to solve:
e. Breakthrough:
17. How often do residents go themselves? How often does pradhan?
a. What issues does pradhan represent?
18. What was the role of political representatives?
a. Councilor:
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b. MLA
c. MP
19. Biggest barriers/ challenges:
20. Issue:
a. Method used:
b. Why it didn't work?
c. Lesson learnt during problem solving: what works?
Service delivery:
Responsible Agency Reasons for improvement
Water supply
Solid waste management
Parks
Sewage
Roads
Security
Electricity
Opinion on issues
1. Are you aware of Bhagidari?
a. What is your opinion?
2. What do you think of RWAs in the area?
3. Are you aware of a new Bhagidari program for slum areas?
1(c): Questionnaire for Political Representatives:
Personal Information:
1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Ward:
4. Educational qualifications:
5. How long have you been serving in this office?
6. How long have you been in active politics?
7. Which party?
8. Why did you join politics? Why this party?
9. Occupation before:
10. Type of seat [General/ SC/ST/ Women]
11. Contact Information:
Ward characteristics:
1. Population:
2. Number of colonies:
a. Names/ characteristic/ tenure status/ renters, owners?
3. Type of facilities in the ward
4. History of the ward
5. How many RWAs in the ward?
6. How many set up after Bhagidari?
Functions and Elections:
1. Main responsibilities
2. Number of site visits
3. Focus of work:
4. Main supporters:
5. Voting pattern by colony?
6. Has the focus shifted/ diversified
7. Amount allotted for the ward. Sources?
8. Amount allotted through councilor/ MLA fund
9. How much of that was spent?
10. Main works carried out during your tenure (by area and year)
11. Aware of 74th Constitutional Amendment and ward committees
12. Aware of Local Area Planning
Relationship with residents and RWAs:
1. Interaction with RWAs:
* Do they contact him/ her?
* If so, how often?
* For what purposes?
* Has the nature of interaction changed? More cooperative/ familiar now?
* How and why?
* Works carried out in colonies with RWAs
* Has the interaction with RWAs changed after Bhagidari?
* Has interaction with residents in colonies with RWAs changed?
2. Are there any colonies (not slums) without RWAs?
* If so, what kind are these?
* How do they voice their demands?
3. Which are the strong RWAs in the ward? What makes them powerful?
4. Agreements and disagreements with RWAs
5. What is the nature of interaction with slum dwellers?
* How often do they contact him/ her?
* Who contact? Pradhan? People?
* What purposes?
* Works carried out in slum areas:
6. New works planned in the ward?
* Who's idea/ initiative
* Where will funding come from?
Opinion on issues
1. RWA federations and RWAs standing for coming elections
2. RWAs providing services (as per MCD statement in 2004)
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ANNEX 2
Municipal Budget Analysis
Municipal Ward Budget Analysis for Wards 16 and 33, Delhi
Lakh (INR) 2002-03 2004-05 2006-07*
Low Income Amount 33.83 30.52 36.62
% of Total 48.4 41.0 44.2
Middle Class Amount 36.11 44 46.22
% of Total 51.6 59.0 55.8
Main Constituency Amount 3.92 16 24.96
% of Total 5.6 21.5 30.1
Low Income Amount 11.92 17.8 14.78
% of Total 16.8 23.3 16.7Ward 33 (North) Middle Class Amount 59.05 58.7 73.59
% of Total 83.2 76.7 83.3
Source: Office of the Chief Engineer, Municipal Corporation of Delhi
*Election year
Note on Methodology: The above data is extracted from Ward Level Municipal Budgets for Delhi
for two the two wards where I conducted fieldwork. I classify expenditure in different areas in the
ward as 'middle class' and 'low income' neighborhoods based on my knowledge of the wards. Since I
am more familiar with the South Delhi ward, I have been able to create a sub-category of 'Low
Income' as 'Main Constituency'. This is the area where the councilor belongs to and his main
supporters live.
Municipal Ward Budget Analysis for Wards 16 and 33, Delhi
* 150
100
4)
44
Low Inoome Middle Class Main Constituency Low Income Middle Class
South North
Ward/ Income Category
E 2002-03 N 2004-05 0 2006-07
Source: Office of the Chief Engineer, Municipal Corporation of Delhi
A
cr
